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ABSTRACT
Balanced Biosocial Theory for the Social Sciences
by
Michael A. Restivo
Dr. David Dickens, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Sociology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Evolutionary theory is the unquestioned paradigm for all biological sciences and is 
gaining acceptance in many of the social sciences, predominantly psychology and 
anthropology. Sociology, as a discipline, has failed to embrace evolutionary theory and 
remains uninformed about the most powerfid scientific theory o f living things: the theory 
of evolution by Darwinian selection. Traditional sociological theory is based largely on 
empirically questionable ideas about human development, behavior, and psychology, and 
often contradicts fundamental knowledge about evolution. As such, it often fails to 
contribute to a coherent and progressive corpus of sociological knowledge. Biosocial 
theories present a compelling alternative to the standard social science model. They 
provide an empirical account for human behavior by drawing on research from the 
biological sciences. I  propose the fbUowing research as a conceptual 6amework for 
biosocial theories in the social sciences, explaining how they might be successftdly 
incorporated into sociological thought
111
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CHAPTER 1
SCIENCE AND SOOOLOGY
If, as professional sociologists, we agree that the goal of our discipline is to 
understand social behavior through the systematic study of humans in their collective 
aspect, then I believe sociology has been slow to realize this goal. Its slow progress is, in 
part, due to sociology's incoherency. As a discipline, it operates with m ultiple, and 
oftentimes contradictory, conceptual hameworks. As such it is unable to integrate all its 
research projects into a unified corpus of knowledge.
Sociology's three grand approaches to studying society and social behavior—  
scientiEc, interpretive, and historical— have yielded insightfW yet only partial answers to 
questions that lie at the heart of the discipline. Each provides a different perspective, 
which consist o f assumptions about ways of thinking about the world, a preferred means 
of conceptualizing the objects of inquiry, and seeking answers to those questions that can 
be adequately addressed by that perspechve. These perspectives are practiced as though 
they are mutually exclusive, but in actuality their content domains overlap. The 
theoretical challenge for sociology lies in creating an integrative approach, one that 
incorporates the strengths of these different approaches by taking into account the 
historical, causal, and meaningfiil dimensions of a social phenomenon.
1 believe it is interactionist sociology, and particularly symbolic interactionism, 
dramaturgy, ethnomethodology, and postmodern interactionism, as research programmes, 
that have been most resistant to an integrative approach. The trend in interactionism in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the last thirty years has been toward increasing separation vis-a-\is other approaches in 
sociology, a contradistinction to the intention of the early interpretive sociologists. One 
need only look at how contemporary interactionism differs from the aim of Weberiein 
sociology to see this difference. Though the foundations for interactionism were laid over 
a century ago by pragmatist philosophy, in the years since Peirce, Mead, and Dewey, 
interactionist sociologists have made few theoretical contributions that are significant 
outside of their perspective and to the discipline o f sociology as a whole. Contemporary 
interactionism has progressed, if  at all, in merely the collecting of limited, fragmented, 
and partial descriptions of phenomena.
Interactionism, as a perspective, relies on several assumptions about the social world: 
'that humans have always existed within society, that society is the source o f our qualities 
as a species (for example, conscience, language, mind, self), and that it is the source of 
our qualities as individuals (interests, values, talents, ideas, and so on)" (Charon 
2001:17). In recent years, these assumptions have been challenged by scientists working 
in the discipline of sociobiology. They have question the notion that it is society alone 
that shapes our self, our brain, our mind, our capacity for language and communication, 
our values, talents, and ideas. Rather, sociobiology posits that it is our biological nature as 
a species that provides a framework by which individuals organize their surroundings.
W ith the arrival o f sociobiology, the stakes for an integrative approach become 
greater. Sociology must now consider insights from the biological sciences as well as the 
approaches of its own discipline. Interactionist sociology can occupy a crucial domain in 
terms of level of analysis. The contents of its study, in effect, lie at the boundaries of all 
other levels of analysis for social behavior, connecting individuals to social structures on 
the grander scale and to biology on the smaller. Interactionism is the glue that can hold a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
comprehensive social science explanation together. It can, and must, carry out this 
important function if  we are to better explain and understand human behavior. But 
interactionist research has become more curiosity than systematic study. Precisely at the 
time when a perspective that can integrate approaches is needed, interactionism has 
retreated from the promise of providing causal and meaningfiil adequacy. It has limited 
itself with several theoretical weaknesses. Interactionism now posits the inherent 
inapplicability of one context to another and unquestionably assumes the importance of 
every interaction. By its own admission, interactionism tries to foster understanding of a 
phenomenon but can really o fkr no guidance as to its meaning outside the unique 
context. How can we as sociologists reconcile the two? One answer being popularized is 
that we cannot. The advent of postmodern influences on interactionism forsakes any 
concern of how to better understand the social world. It  has failed to contribute 
improvements of any consequence, and rather has m ystif ed and obfuscated the entire 
ordeal.
Recalling Peirce, I implore that we need to rescue the good ship sociology for the 
service of science iGrom the lawless rovers of the sea of interactionism. There is no better 
indication of success than progress, and those scientiGc disciplines that have shown a 
clear progression o f knowledge are beneBting at sociology's expense. No longer can 
sociology claim that a particular phenomenon falls on 'our tu rf and hence our 
explanations are good enough. Biology has suggested ways to fn d  better answers, and the 
time has come for sociology to revise its theories so as to consider what biology can teach 
us. An integrative approach that reaches across disciplinary borders and adopts new 
theories, concepts, and practices, w ill once again unite sociology with the corpus of 
scientifc knowledge.
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But these are merely position statements, not arguments. In  this research, I  w ill review 
the case for practicing sociology as a science, outline the major theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of evolutionary theory and its approaches to studying 
social behavior, assess the limited attempts of traditional sociology to incorporate the 
relevant theories and findings 6om the biological sciences, and finally, suggest a way for 
interactionist sociology to cooperate with the dominant' biological-science paradigm of 
evolutionary theory.
Social Science
Although it has recently become the 'postmodern' 6shion to declare science either 
dead on arrival or irrelevant to an understanding of our own species, twenty years ago 
the vast m^ority of social and behavioral scientists took it for granted that the 
development of a true science of human behavior, society, and culture was the Holy 
Grail toward which they were striving. (Cronk 1999:42)
Science has been one of the most successful ways of acquiring knowledge. It is the 
activity that the scientific community takes part in because it is perceived as having a 
successful method for seeking and arriving at useful knowledge about the physical world. 
"What makes a held a science is not found in the way it collects its basic data but rather 
in the way in which it phrases questions, tests them, and makes claims about new 
knowledge" (Cronk 1999:51). Science relies on empirical observations, logical induction, 
the hypothetico-deductive method, and in using these it aims to develop theories that are 
able to explain and predict occurrences in the physical world.
1 I can already anticipate a Neo-Marxist-inspired criticism of my use of the word "dominant," 
attacking evolutionary theory as "bourgeois hegemony" oppressing "emancipatory" science; or a 
feminist-inspired criticism that condemns "dominant" as a metaphor for masculine-bias and 
subjugation of a "woman's way of knowing"; or a postmodem-inspired criticism of my use of the 
word "dominant" as a demonstration that evolutionary theory is accepted over other theories 
(which can be more-or-less "true") only by social and political negotiation. (Notice the scare 
quotes.)
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In sociology's short history as an academic discipline, sociologists have variously 
embraced two contradictory models for how sociology should be conducted, either as a 
science or as an anti-scientihc discipline. The early influential sociologists all promoted 
sociology as a science of the social world. More recently, some sociologists, most often 
associated with interpretive sociology, argue that the scientific model is inappropriate and 
wrong for sociology. They promote an alternative purpose for sociology, one that aims 
not for discovering deterministic or probabihstic laws, but for understanding motivation 
and meaning h-om the perspective of the individual.
Dualistic thinking characterizes much sociology, and these alternative conceptions of 
sociology are often thought to be opposed to one another. There is room in sociology for 
both, and indeed the content of sociological research w ill be richer by incorporating the 
two. In this research, I  am mainly emphasizing new ways for sociology to be practiced in 
the scientiEc model, but I w ill modestly propose some ways for the two approaches to be 
reconciled. A  biosocial approach to sociology, the topic of this research, is one that goes 
beyond the traditional sociological focus o f looking only to social phenomena in order to 
explain social behavior. It accepts that the knowledge produced by other scientific 
disciplines can be relevant to understanding our social behavior, and as such, it 
incorporates those theories and concepts that are relevant into its explanations. Biosocial 
^proaches are still the domain of the social sciences; the biological discipline of 
sociobiology, in contrast, "has a more ambitious agenda, [as] it concerns itself with the 
behavior of all animals, has a grand theory (evolutionary theory), and it seeks ultimate 
causes" (Walsh 1995:1). It is a scientific discipline within the held o f evolutionary 
biology that seeks to imcover the biological basis for social behavior. For our purposes in
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the social sciences, sociobiology is a discipline that we can leam from, not one that we 
must stand in contrast to.
The Importance ofTheoiy 
It is almost obligatory for any research about science to talk about Kuhn's 
j'trwctwrg (1970). One diKculty of this work lies in the
numerous and imprecise uses of the term paradigm. A t the narrowest sense, a paradigm is 
a piece o f technical equipment or a set o f exemplars in scientific achievement. In its 
widest sense, a paradigm is the entire theoretical, methodological, ethical, 
epistemological, and ontological worldview of science. A  third sense o f the paradigm is 
the sociological community of science, including research and educational institutions. 
When we speak of a paradigm in science or a paradigm far sociology, we must first 
dehne what this means.
Ritzer uses a narrow definition of paradigm to mean the sociological organization that 
"serves to differentiate one scientihc community (or subcommunity) from another" 
(1975:6). He goes on to explain that "paradigms can, in a sense, co-exist within a given 
science . . .  multiple paradigms co-exist within contemporary sociology, but they do not 
co-exist peacefully" (p. 12). This dehnition is useful in the sense of demarcation, but tells 
us little about content of a scientiGc paradigm.
It is more useful to use paradigm to mean the conceptual Gamework that a scientiGc 
community assumes and works as a part of. That is to say, scientiGc research, theory, or 
pracGces w ill make sense only in relaGon to the conceptual Gamework under which it 
exists.^  The conceptual Gamework of sociology is one that can best be called pre-
2 Other terms that have been used to mean nearly the same thing are worldview (Weltanschauung), 
categorical scheme, or framework.
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scientiGc in that it is only snccessGil at "amassing a wealth of data on a variety o f topics
because they do not have a clear idea o f what is important" (Cronk 1999:46). How is this
a hindrance to the social sciences? Imagine if  chemistry today was practiced the the same
way as sociology. Anthropologist Henry Harpending speculates:
We would spend a lot of money measuring anything measurable about substances and 
materials around us. With modem computers, we would create a huge database; with 
modem software, we would make any patterns readily ^parent. We would discover, 
for example, a correlation between "conducts electricity" and "shininess." In the jargon 
we would say that "shininess" is a determinant of conducting electricity. Another group 
would find that "density" is also a determinant of conducting electricity. Papers would 
appear discussing whether density is a determinant of shinmess or shininess of density.
None of this would get us close to the periodic table or anywhere near modem 
chemistry. Meanwhile policy experts would advocate polishing household machinery to 
make it shinier and thus more eScient. Universities would be plagued with workshops 
on shining things up. (Harpending 1995:100)
A paradigm gives scienGsts a framework of Gmdamental theones and exemplary 
examples of appGcaGons of theory and research; it identiGes accepted accomplishments 
and points to important quesGons that ean be solved by Grrther research; and it provides 
researchers with methods and standards for Gnding soluGons. The paradigms in sociology 
do not serve this GmcGon for pracGcing sociologists. Some sociologists argne to the 
contrary, that adopting a scientiGc paradigm wiU prohibit sociology Gom conducting 
research that is relevant to soeiology, and henee, this is not a model soeiology should 
follow. Others recognize the value of a coherent conceptual Gamework, but argue that 
sociology's paradigmaGc state is Gne, and sociological theory is adequate in its own nght. 
It only appears limited because sociology is in its disciplinary infancy, and just needs to 
be progressively developed and intemaGy connected.
There are sociologists, however, who do believe that sociology's failure to become a 
progressive, high-consensus science stems Gom its pre-paradigmatie state. Price laments 
that "Sociology lacks a common set of eoncepts, has very few veriGed proposiGons, and
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is totally devoid of systemaGeally tested theory" (1969:iii). Sociology's strength lies in its 
comprehensive collecGon of historically Actual infbrmaGon and methodology of data 
collecGon; its weakness lies in its dearth o f adequate concepts and theories.
Defending Science
What makes a Geld a science is not found in the way it collects its basic data but rather 
in the way in which it phrases questions, tests them, and makes claims about new 
knowledge. (Cronk 1999:51)
This, some criGcs assert, is the myth o f science. They argue that science as a 
discipline relies on a Gawed methodology for learning about the world, and that science 
maintains a limited perspecGve on the nature of reality . It ehallenges the assumpGon of of 
science that there is a natural world 'out there' that can be objecGvely explained.
Peiree said a century ago that "a man must be downright crazy to doubt that science 
has made many true discovenes" (193 lb: 106). Yet there are many— p^racGGoners o f the 
sGong programme in the sociology of science— w^ho have these doubts. They regard 
science as a myth-making enterprise, as a whoGy social endeavor, one that has no 
recourse to the physical world because reality is itself a soeial construcGon—"the 
construcGvist asserGon that scienGGcthemselves were socially constructed" 
(Segerstrâle 2000:4).^  For example, Collins stated that the "natural world has a small or 
non-existent role in the construcGon of scientiGc knowledge" (1981:3). A  more moderate 
version of the sGong programme in the sociology of science has "come to view scienGGc 
knowledge as a social construcGon rather than a product o f pure cogniGon or descripGon. 
. .  ScientiGc knowledge is a product of social worA, a (fzscw.rrt;g accomplishment" 
(ResGvo 1994:21, itaUcs in onginal). What makes this moderate is that it maintains a
3 "Constructivism" and "social constructionism" are used synonymously.
8
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posiüon o f ontological realism. Nonetheless, both versions of the strong programme 
dispute the the epistemological claims o f science.
Other soeiologists of science analyze scienee as an instituGon that is guided by certain 
soeial norms, and is influenced and influences other social instituGons. This is the so- 
called Mertonian paradigm. It acknowledges that there are both social forces and 
immanent forces in the development of science. Social forces are those factors that shape 
science as an rnsGtuGon and describe how the insGtuGon works, \\dGle immanent forces 
are the inner logic that explains how and why seienGGc ideas emerge (ResGvo 1994; 
Segerstrâle 2000). For a Mertonian analysis of scienee, scienGGe knowledge is placed in a 
black-box outside the scope of inquiry and outside the inGuence of social forces.
A  sigiGGcant number of criGcisms of science have emerged based on standpoint 
epistemologies. These challenge that posiGvist, post-posiGvist, and other modem 
concepGons o f epistemology are male-biased or Eurocentric (see AlcoG" and Potter 1993). 
One soluGon, for example, is the development o f a "femiinst epistemology [that] consists 
of theones of knowledge created women, women's modes o f knowing,/or the 
purpose of GberaGng women" (Koertge 1996:413, italics in onginal). Others eontend that 
all scienee is paradigm-bound and hence can only offer different, not better, explanaGons 
for phenomena. These cnGeisms are themselves all subject to the ereeping of 
epistemological relaGvism. On grounds of this drawback and the deGciency of being able 
to formulate cogent altemaGve epistemologies, Koertge eoncludes that cnGes "Gnd their 
substanGve claims unpersuasive" (1996:414). Haack (1994; 1998), Radcliffe Richards 
(1996), Sommers (1994), and others offer sound criGques of this contemporary version of 
the oA-raised philosophical issue of epistemological perspecGvism.
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A popular tact is for criGcs to use these a&remenGoned criGcisms as a summary
criGque of scientists as naively parGcipaGng in an epistemologically, empirically, and
methodologically Gawed enterprise. Steven Weinberg, winner of a Nobel Prize for
physics, rejects this idea, noting that
sociologists and histonans sometinies write as if  scienGsts had not learned anything 
about the scienGGc method since the days of Francis Bacon, while of course we know 
very weU how complicated the relaGon is between theory and expenment, and how 
much the work of science depends on appropnate social and economic setGngs.
(2003:217)
When this summary criGcism of science fails, criGcs may tout, seemingly as a last 
resort, the failures of the project of posiGvism as evidence that sociology should rely on 
altemaGve models for acqinring knowledge. But by doing this, many contemporary criGcs 
o f science sound as if  they just discovered the Grst half o f the twenGeth century, and hope 
nobody else noGced. The grand ambiGon of logical posiGvism was done in by Duhem, 
Quine, WiGgenstein and others before any social scienGst began cnticizing it as an 
invalid model for knowledge.
It  is pertinent for us to be aware of the criticisms and limitaGons of science, and the 
consequent relevance to our pracGce of sociology. Indeed, these are aG cromulent 
reGecGons on epistemological and ontological issues in science. Accordingly, a 
sigiGGcant number of sociologists are wary in one of the manners ouGined above of 
pracGcing sociology as a science. We should be &m iliar with these criGcisms and how 
scienGsts and philosophers respond (see Gross and LeviG 1994; Gross, Levitt, and Lewis 
1996; Parsons 2003; SegersGâle 2000). Although mine is not the place to present an in- 
depth defense of science Gom its criGcs, I  believe that the project o f sociology should 
continue to be the scienGGc study of the social world. Steven Cole provides us with a 
pragmatic reason to not abandon this project. In  terms o f scienGGc knowledge, that is, the
10
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cogniGve content that a scientific commnnity accepts, criGcs " h a v e r o  give a .ymgZe 
wAere tAe socW j7rocej^ se.y z/^ weMce tAe coMie/ztof snch a discovery" (1996:280, 
emphasis added)/ I f  this indeed is the case, as Cole's review of the contemporary science 
criGcism literature indicates, then truly "ours is an age in which parGal truths are tirelessly 
Gansfbrmed into total Glsehoods and then acclaimed as revoluGonary revelaGons" (Szasz 
1973:23-24). Because this research is about the content of a scientiGc discipline as it can 
apply to sociology, and our scientiGc knowledge, while not immune to cnGcism 
nonetheless remains for now on secure ground, we can be safe in our decision to leave 
these debates behind and to move on.
UniGcaGon
What is wrong is that sociology is incoherent. . .  While each article/book/course may 
be well crafted, they have litüe to do with each other. They may share methods and 
even data sets . . .  but each is about a unique problem with a unique set of variables.
(Davis 2001:99)
One of the assumpGons of science is the uiGGcaGon o f knowledge. The concept of 
uniGcaGon commonly goes by the name reducGonism, and science is oGen cnGcized for 
championing a reducGonist role for science. But the term reducGon in the philosophy of 
science is oGen used to mean diGerent things. In  its sGongest meaiGng, also called micro- 
reducGon, the speciGc goal is to be able to, in principle, use a unique lowest level o f 
analysis (particle physics) in order to explain any higher-level phenomenon (like 
psychology), even though "it would nevertheless be hopelessly impracGcal to try to denve 
the behavior of a single human being direcGy Gom his consGtuGon in terms of elementary 
parGcles" (Oppenheim and Putnam 1998:269). While some scienGsts and philosophers
4 Cole goes on to say: "A Gequently used construcGvist rhetoncal trick is to argue that it is
impossible to separate the technical Gom the social; that all science is inherently social. This turns 
their entire argument into a tautology" (1996:280).
11
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have advocated this, most philosophers o f science advocate the more modest use of 
reducGon, sometimes called hierarchical reducGonism: to accept that di% rent disciplines 
win concenGate on diGerent levels of analysis of a phenomenon, but where the levels of 
analysis meet or overlap, the disciplines should use the same concepts.
This second, more modest type of reducGon approaches the meaning o f uniGcaGon. 
Because of the many ways in which the term reducGon is used, the use of the term 
uiuGcaGon is preGrred for the sake of clarity and disGncGveness. Even then, uniGcaGon 
often goes by diGerent names. Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow refer to uniGcaGon as 
verGcal iutegraGon, "the principle that the various disciplines within the behavioral and 
social sciences should make themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is 
known in the natural sciences as well" (1992:4). WGson calls this consihence, "a beGef in 
the unity o f the sciences" (1998:4). Steven Pinker champions a type of reducGon that 
leads to uniGcaGon, and despite the terminological confusion, gives an example that 
succincGy demonstrates the virtues of uniGcaGon: mountains are just sand and dirt, but a 
physics or chemistry alone cannot e^glain the geography of Europe (Radkoff 2002).
The appeal of unGying the natural and social sciences is that it would allow
explanaGons of social behavior on many levels of analysis to be empirically consistent
with one another. I f  a theory is suppoGed by hypotheses on mulGple levels of
organizaGon, it is a more successful contribuGon to scientiGc knowledge. Ultimately, this
would be beneGcial to both sociology and biology.
Consider the prospects tor sociology. This science is now in the natural history stage of 
its development. There have been attempts at system building but, just as in 
psychology, they were premature and came to little. Much of what passes for theory in 
sociology today is really labeling of phenomena and concepts, in the expected manner 
of natural history. Process is difficult to analyze because the fundamental units are 
elusive, perhaps nonexistent. (Wilson 1975:574)
12
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Sociology would gain access to a corpus o f empirically-justiGed knowledge, methods 
o f conducting research, and novel theories & r studying behavior. The exchange of 
disciplinary knowledge is a two-way street, and sociology would have much to offer 
biology as well. "Just as modem biology must take chemistry into account if  it is to have 
any claim to completeness, so the behavioral sciences must take evolution into account G 
they are to deserve being called sciences. Yet just as there is much in modem biology that 
is not explained by a knowledge of chemistry alone, there is much in the behavioral 
sciences that goes beyond the analytic and interpretive power of sociobiology" (Barash 
1982:6). One contribuGon that sociology would have for biology is its perspecGve of 
interacGonism, which is the best available perspecGve for studying and understanding that 
cmcial contextual component of the environment variable.
In  spite of the potenGal beneGts to both disciplines, an uneasy boundary is maintained 
by many social scienGsts between their Geld and the biological sciences. Maintaining 
these disciplinary boundaries serves two funcGons. The Grst is that prevents taking on the 
inherent diKculGes of combining disciplines, which would entail organizaGonal and 
social chaGenges on the part of the insGtuGons involved. This is an argument about the 
way science funcGons as a social insGtuGon, not about the content o f the scientiGc 
discipline. But arGGcially maintaining boundaries because of social organizaGon can 
detrimentaGy affect the development and progression of scienGGc knowledge. WGson 
(1982) descnbes the creaGve tension between disciplines and anGdiscipGnes  ^that 
ultimately causes the advancement of both. One of the proponents for a biosocial
5 The term anGdiscipline is troublesome because its ostensible meaning is oppoggtf to a gcigMti/zc 
(fzaczpZing. The true meaning of the term as Wilson uses it, however, is agoznat a z/wczp/me. He 
explains that it refers to "studies of adjacent levels of organizaGon" (1982:29) where the pracGces 
and theories of an established discipline at one level of analysis come up against a newly 
developing discipline (the anGdiscipline) Gom a higher or lower level of analysis. Eventually, these 
two become complementary in their explanations of their adjacent levels of organizaGon.
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approach in the social sciences, the criminologist Anthony Walsh, is keenly aware o f this, 
explaining that "complex social phenomena can be more understood if  their 
explanations maintain consistency with what we know about the more elementary units" 
(1995:3, italics in original). Such consistency can only come at the expense o f signiGcant 
reorganizaGon in the way the social sciences are pracGced.
The second function of maintaiiGng disciplinary boundaries is potenGally more 
Goubling. It aUows for the development of theones that conGict with those Gom other 
disciplines. Research of this sort can occur urGntenGonally, because the methodology of 
one discipline is generally not suited to analyzing the concepts Gom another, leading to 
empincaGy inadequate theorizing. But maintaining that two disciplines are incompaGble 
can also be used as an intenGonal way to promote theones that otherwise would be 
empiricaGy indefensible. Such use of science would be nearly indistinguishable Gom 
ideology and thus is anGtheGcal to the idea o f the uniGcaGon. Requiring interdiscipGnary 
consistency and exposing research to such review wiG only improve theones, methods, 
and findings.
Biophobia
Nearly all o f the classical social theonsts considered the role of biology in then
theones. Knowledge Gom the biological sciences has progressed sigiGGcanGy since the
fbundaGons of sociology were laid, but attempts to incorporate biology into contemporary
sociology have met with increasing hosGGty. Two years after the release of Edward O.
WGson's in the midst o f the sociobiology debate, sociologist Gerhard
Lenski opined that sociology's
longstanding opposition to efforts to take biological factors into account in tbe study of 
buman social systems bas become an albatross. I f  we persist in ignoring, or worse yet,
14
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denying the powerful influence of geneGc and biochemical factors, we jeopardize 
sociology's credibility in the scientiGc community. Environmentalist arguments that 
may have been persuasive in the 1920s and 1930s no longer wash, and the longer we 
persist in propounding them, the more we harm our discipline and reduce its potential. 
(1977:73)'
In  the nearly thirty years since, sociology's animosity toward the biological sciences 
has grown greater as evolnhonary biology has made inroads into research areas 
GadiGonally thought to be sociology's domain. This short history of progress in 
evoluGonary biology makes Lenski's remark seem prophetic.
Social constructivism enshrines culture as the central concept to be used to explain 
human social behavior. "Culture is a thing swf generG which can be explained only in 
terms of itself' (Lowie 1917:25, italics in original). Durkheim, one o f the founding 
6thers of sociology, also favored only social explanaGons for social behavior: "The 
determining cause of a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding it 
and not among the states of individual consciousness" (1895a: 110). Stretching the logic 
of this posiGon, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz claims that "our ideas, our values, our 
acts, even our emoGons, are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products— products 
manufactured, indeed, out of tendencies, capaciGes, and disposiGons with which we were 
bom, but manufactured nonetheless" (1973:50). Taken further to its logical exGeme, it is 
the tenuous posiGon of postmodern construcGvism.^  As such, this implies several beliefs 
about the limitaGons of evoluGonary biology's contribuGons to studying culture. Our 
evoluGoaary past, it is argued, has no relevance for our current condiGon. Human 
behavior arises and is shaped largely by culture, and culture is not influenced by our 
evoluGonary past but instead is best accounted for by cultural explanaGons (Cartwright
6 See Hacking ( 1999) for clariGcaGon and analysis of the constructivist position. See also Haack 
(1998) on the quesGon of science as a social construcGon, and Sokal and Bncmont (1998) on 
postmodernism and science.
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2000; Rose and Rose 2000). EvoluGonary biologists expGciGy reject these limitaGons, 
arguing instead that our evoluGonary past does play a role in shaping our social behavior 
and hence our current cultural condiGons. As such, there must be a signiGcant biological 
component that influences the development of culture.
There seem to be some intellectual obstacles to incorporating biological concepts and 
theones into sociology. EGis (1996) suggests one common-sense reason: social scienGsts 
generaUy lack training in and knowledge of biology. So many aGempts to import biology 
into the social sciences have been riddled with inaccurate use of biological concepts that a 
basic understanding of biology should be a prerequisite. Acquiring this knowledge 
requGes 6miGanzing oneseG with material outside the domain of traditional sociology. 
Consequendy, many social scienGsts are content to remain unacquainted with biology, or 
the more pernicious, to use biology with no proGciency.
Van den Berghe (1978) suggests a number of addiGonal reasons why sociology 
remains hosGle toward biology, which I  wiG bneGy outline here. First is the social 
sciences resistance to reducGonism and uniGcaGon within science. Confusion due to the 
many meanings of reducGon in science (see above) does not help the matter, but 
sociology has an addiGonal reason to reject reducGonism. Sociology has a long-standing 
tradiGon of reifying the group. SocieGes are made of individual actors, but socieGes, 
cultures, social structures, groups, and networks of individuals are thought to be a 
separate reality and the preferred level o f analysis for sociology. This thinking can be 
traced back, in part, to Durkheim, who famously argued for social-level explanaGons of 
social phenomena: "every time that a social phenomenon is dGecGy explained by a 
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanaGon is false" (Durkheim  
1895b: 129). The reasoiGng Durkheim employs immediately pGor to making this
16
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pronouncement is not so famously remembered: "In a word, there is between psychology 
and sociology the same break in continuity as between biology and the physicochemical 
sciences" (p. 129). This conclusion— a^ necessary break in continuity between levels of 
analysis— h^as proved to be false not only for biology but for all the natural sciences. 
WGson (1982) points out that drawing a conclusion by this reasoning is as likely to be 
wrong for sociology as weG. That social organizaGon is an emergent charactensGc of 
individuals interacting is not in quesGon. But whether this consGtutes a separate reality 
that operates independenüy of the forces of lower-level phenomena is unproven and 
doubtfW. Biology focuses on the lowest possible level o f organizaGon for social behavior, 
whereas sociology focuses on the highest As such, they represent opposite approaches to 
studying social phenomena, and ideally these two levels of analysis should be 
complementary rather than antagoiGsGc.
DualisGc thinking also characterizes much research in the social sciences. Because 
sociologists tend to favor social construcGvist models, they oAen view biology as 
geneGcaGy determinist The reasoning becomes that sociology should not incorporate 
biology because it is anathema to sociological reasoning. EvoluGonary theory, however, 
emphasizes the interacGon between organisms and environments, favoring neither 
inGuence in its explanaGons. Whether it is caGed environment, nurture, social learning, or 
most-broadly culture, it is only half of the equaGon. Sociology should not reject the other 
half.
"Perhaps the most common ground far rejecting a biological approach to human 
behavior is the presumably unique self-consciousness of human beings . . .  Because 
humans are self-conscious organisms, it is argued, then behavior is m przMcip/e not 
comparable to that of other animals" (van der Berghe 1978:37-8, itahcs in onginal). For
17
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interpretive sociologists who beheve behavior is conscious, meaningful, and moGvated, 
the phenomenon of consciousness is a limitaGon that in principle is grounds for rejecGng 
biology. However, because evoluGon shaped the development of human consciousness, 
and consciousness is structured, ordered, and influenced by biological forces, these 
consideraGons would seem to nullify the argument that phenomena resulting Gom 
conscious human behavior is outside the scope of biological study. "Our mind structures 
our expenence, but the structures used have been laid down duGng the evoluGon o f the 
species" (Cartwnght 2000:18).
Other sociologists reject that consciousness plays a signiGcant role in social 
phenomena, but nonetheless also reject biology for the reason of the uniqueness o f human 
consciousness. It is paradoxical in this case because for these sociologists, the social 
world is a reality fwz which similarly favors ignoring conscious moGvaGon.
Biological forces can, as surely as social forces, shape patterns in the social world 
independent of human consciousness.
One addiGonal issue related to consciousness continues to be an impediment to 
biological thinking. It is the growing trend in interacGonist sociology to focus attenGon on 
verbal instead of nonverbal behavior. It is true that we give accounts o f our moGves, 
intenGons, and the meanings for our acGons, but in spite o f this, we sGÜ act in parGcular 
ways. Verbal behavior can lead us to misunderstand why people act the way they do. 
Pinker (2002) reteüs an example where a neurosurgeon had to sever a paGent's corpus 
callosum, a brain structure that connects the two hemispheres, to eliminate the paGent's 
severe seizures. After the successfiil surgery, the doctors had the paGent undergo some 
experiments to determine the side-effects, if  any. What they found was bizarre. Because
18
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the two hemispheres of the brain were no longer able to commnnicate, so to speak, they 
found that
if  an experimenter flashes the command "WALK" to the right hemisphere (by keeping 
it in the part of the visual held that only the right hemisphere can see), the person will 
comply with the request and begin to walk out of the room. But when the person. . .  is 
asked why he just got up, he will say, in all sincerity, "To get a Coke"— rather than "I 
don't really know" . . .  Similarly, if  the patient's leA hemisphere is shown a chicken and 
his right hemisphere is shown a snow&ll, and both hemispheres have to select a picture 
that goes with what they see . . .  the leA hemisphere picks a claw (correctly) and the 
right picks a shovel (also correctly). But when the leA hemisphere is asked why the 
person made those choices, it blithely says, "Oh, Aat's simple. The chicken claw goes 
with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed." (Pinker 
2002:43)
Unlike in this example, healthy humans walk around with their corpus callosum 
intact. Nevertheless, this type of research is helping show that there are allegedly separate 
domains for action and explanation that function simultaneously in our brains. The parts 
that accoimt for the conscious or verbal explanations many times may merely be 
providing us with interpretations of the actions prompted by another part of our brain.
I f  a neurological undermining of intentionality is not aB-together convincing, keep in 
mind that "perhaps the most damaging criticism [of intentionality]. . .  is the fact that each 
person is not necessarily the best or sole judge of his own intentions" (Fay 1975:74). 
Sociological research, because of the potential value of knowing conscious intentions, 
must operate with a greater naïveté, and consequently, is more susceptible to being 
mislead by verbal behavior.
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CHAPTER 2
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
EvoluHonaiy biology operates within the paradigm of evolutionary theory, evolution 
by natural selection. It provides the unil^ ing interpretive framework for research and 
theories. It also constitutes a valuable paradigm for the life sciences that stem from 
biology, such as behavioral biology, populaf on biology, and ethology.
Sociobiology is the discipline f-om which biosocial approaches can draw the relevant 
concepts and theories. Because sociobiology is a specifc application of evolutionary 
biology, a basic understanding of the concepts of evolution is necessary.
Natural Selection
In the On tAg Origin q/'.^ eciea^ (1859), Darwin's greatest contribution was not the 
introduction o f the idea of evolution, which had been a theory going back all the way to 
the ancient Greeks (G ifispie 1960), but rather the mechanism by which evolution 
operates. Darwin described this mechanism as natural selection. I  w ill briefly outline the 
components o f natural selection according to Darwin.
AH living things have a tendency to produce more oSspring than necessary for the 
population to remain at the same size. I f  this process goes unchecked, the increase in 
population expands exponentially. However, over long periods of time, each species' 
population tends to remain stable despite this tendency to overproduce. Among sexually 
reproducing species, differences exist among individuals (except for identical twins).
20
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Some o f the differing characteristics of individuals are passed on to their offspring. I f  the 
population of a species remains stable over time, some individuals must be more 
successftd than others in producing ofkpring or some offspring are more successful at 
maturing and producing their own offspring. Individuals possessing characteristics that 
make them more capable of maturing to adulthood and reproducing w ill tend to do so and 
be better represented in the next generation. Natural selection is the differential 
reproduction o f individuals and genes hom one generation to the next The accumulation 
o f gradual changes in the genetic makeup of a species occurs through the forces of natural 
selection constantly operating on succeeding generations. These changes are evolution 
(Barash 1982; Endler 1992; Hodge 1992).
Phenotype and Genotype
To understand natural selection, it is important to understand the distinction between 
an organism's phenotype and genotype. Phenotype refers to any actual, observable 
characteristics— such as size, shape, structure, behavior.^  By contrast, an organism's 
genotype constitutes its genetic makeup.^  The genotype is usually only discernible 
through its influence on the organism's phenotype, but these concepts are distinct from 
each other.
It is important to recognize that the interaction of both genetic and environmental 
characteristics determine an organism's phenotype. Neither genes alone nor 
environmental factors alone can solely determine the phenotype. It is only through
7 Lewontin (1992) offers a more precise definition: "The 'phenotype' of an organism is the class of 
which it is a member based upon the observable physical qualities of the organism, including its 
morphology, physiology, and behavior at all levels of description" (p. 137).
8 Lewontin again: "The 'genotype' of an organism is the class of which it is a member based upon 
the postulated state of its internal hereditary factors, the genes" (1992:137).
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epigenesis that a phenotype emerges. Epigenesis is "the process of interaction between 
genes and the environment that ultimately result in the distinctive anatomical, 
physiological, cognitive, and behavioral traits of the organism" (Lumsden and Wilson 
1981:370).
Conceptually separating genetic and environmental influence during epigenesis is 
important to understanding how natural selection works. Imagine, for instance, identical 
twins of any species. Identical twins share the same genotype. However, imagine that in 
this case, one is chronically malnourished from birth but the other receives adequate 
nourishment. The diSerence in their observable characteristics— bone density, muscle 
mass, height, weight, et cetera, i.e. their phenotypes— w ill in this case be the result o f 
environmental and not genetic factors.
I f  individuals possess characteristics (a phenotype) that enable them to produce more 
successful offspring, they are said to be reproductively favored. Individuals may beneût 
f-om having phenotypes that develop as a result o f fortunate environmental factors (as the 
example above illustrates). Or, individuals may develop phenotypes with favorable 
characteristics as a result o f genetic diSerences. Only the characterisf cs of the genotype 
is passed on to offspring through reproduction. Natural selecfon can only 'select' a 
genotype. Recalling that evoluf on is the gradual accumulation o f genetic changes within 
a species, we see then that natural selection can only produce evolutionary change in a 
population in which the individuals who are reproductively favored have favorable 
phenotypes that are the result of genefc and not environmental factors (Barash 1982; 
Endler 1992).
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Chromosomes, Genes, and Alleles
Providing definitions for some terms fom  genetics is in order. A ll o f our genes exist 
in structures called chromosomes. Chromosomes are compact intertwined molecules of 
DNA found in the nucleus of cells. Chromosomes contain the cell's genetic information 
or genes. Humans normally have 23 pairs of chromosomes (46 total chromosomes), one 
chromosome of each pair inherited from each parent. The defnition of a gene is less 
clear; branches of biology define genes diferently so as to be a usable concept in the 
discipline. One definition is that each gene codes for an individual protein. An alternative 
defnition is that a gene can be identified by analyzing the base-pair sequence on the 
chromosome on which it resides. Others use it broadly to mean an inheritable section of 
DNA. These various definitions do not imply that a gene is an arbitrary conception, but 
rather it is defned differently by biologists who are studying different aspects of genetics. 
The most basic defnition of a gene, which subsumes all o f the ways in which other 
biologists define it more precisely it in more specialized contexts, is that a gene is "a 
genetic unit which is small enough to last for a large number of generations and to be 
distributed around in the form of many copies . . .  a little bit o f chromosome which 
potentially lasts for many generations" (Dawkins 1976:34-5).
Because only one gene can be contained at any one position on a chromosome, any 
genes that can potentially reside in the same spot are called alleles. They can be thought 
to be rivals far a specific position on a chromosome (Dawkins 1976). An allele is one of 
several alternative forms of the same gene. In a population, there can be any number of 
alleles, but only one can be present on in any individual chromosome. The gene pool, 
then, can be thought of as all the alleles present in a population.
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The Synthetic Theory of Evolution
W hile Darwin and his contemporaries described the mechanism of evolution, they did 
so without our modem understanding o f genetics. The modem synthetic theory of 
evolution combines the mechanism of natural selection with insights 6om the discipline 
o f population genetics. Evolution involves a change in gene Hequencies in a population. 
I f  the 6equencies of genes in a population remain in a statistical distribution (because 
there are no &ctors which modify their Bequencies), that population's gene pool is said to 
be in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.^  In a population in such equilibrium, evolution is not 
taking place. The study of evolution, then, is the study of the factors that disrupt Hardy- 
Weinberg equilibrium (Barash 1982). There can be an influx or outflow of genes between 
populations (immigration and emigration), resulting in new genes entering or existing 
genes being removed from a population. Random mutation can also introduce new genes 
and eliminate old ones. The equilibrium of a genetic population can also be affected by 
genetic drift; when breeding occurs in a small population, some of the genetic diversity is 
Tost' or underrepresented in offspring by statistical chance. Frequencies of genes in such 
a population are said to drift randomly (that is, nonadaptively) &om one generation to the 
next.
The most significant 6ctor that disrupts genetic equilibrium is natural selection. 
Individuals differ in their reproductive success because of differing phenotypes. Genes 
are one component that shape an individual's phenotype. Genes, then, also differ in their 
reproductive success because they are transmitted by individuals during reproduction.
The fitness of genes is a measure of their reproductive success. Fitness is not a fixed.
9 A cornerstone of population genetics is the Hardy-Weinberg law. It explains the relationship 
between frequencies of genes in a population and the various combinations of genes in individuals.
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inherent measure, but rather is relative to aU other traits which affect reproductive 
success, and also relative to the environment "A trait may confer high fitness in one 
environment but low fitness in another" (Barash 1982:23).
Adaptations
There are two ways in which the term adaptation is used m evolutionary biology. The 
term adaptation, in the first sense, is used to mean the evolutionary process of 
"transgenerational alterations of the features and capacities of organisms in a lineage that 
enable them to solve . . .  problems posed by the environment, problems of internal 
integration, and the problem of reproducing" (Burian 1992:7). Natural selection causes 
the differential reproduction of individuals with phenotypic advantages, producing these 
changes.
A second way in which adaptation is used is to mean features of organisms. A  
characteristic of an organism that increases its ûtness (that is, its reproductive success) is 
called an adaptation. "Adaptations are phenotypic Matures (morphological structures, 
physiological mechanisms, and behaviors) that are present in individual organisms 
because they were favored by natural selection in the past" (Thornhill and Palmer 
2000:5). An adaptation is the difference in one trait Bom another that results in increased 
fitness for the individual (Clutton-Brock and Harvey 1979).
It is important to make the distinction between traits that have a high adaptive value 
and adaptations. "To be considered an adaptation a trait must be shown to be a 
consequence of selection for that trait" (West-Eberhard 1992:13). A  trait may have a high 
adaptive value (that is, it contributes to the adaptedness of a organism) but this these traits 
may not have necessarily been selected for (Burian 1992). They may be the result o f an
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incidental "good fit between the organism and the environment" or "ability to perform a 
task effectively" (West-Eberhard 1992:13). Because of a phenomenon called pleiotropy 
— "^the the tendency for genes to have multiple effects" (Barkowl989:29)— it is often 
difficult to know the diSerence between an adaptation and an incidentally-useful trait.
Proximate and Ultimate Causes
Evolutionary scientists employ two levels of analysis in determining the cause of 
behavior.They speak of proximate causation and ultimate causation." First, it should be 
clear that, in this context, cause is used to mean "that without which an efkct or 
phenomenon would not exist" (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:4). This is the scientific 
conception of cause. In  seeking to determine what causes a particular behavior in an 
individual, one is actually seeking the answers to a number of separate but related 
questions: What stimuli or factors ehcit such behavior? What genetic, physiological, or 
psychological mechanisms influence such behavior? What :&ctors present in the 
environment elicit such behavior? To answer these questions is to seek a proximate cause 
o f behavior (Barash 1982). The proximate causes of behavior are "those that operate over 
the short term— t^he immediate causes of behavior" (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:4). These 
include bodily traits, like genes, hormones, and brain mechanisms, and environmental 
stimuli, both psychological and social.
Evolutionary scientists also are interested in the ultimate causes o f behavior. They 
would ask additional questions about what causes a particular behavior: What is the
10 Because this paper is primarily concerned with human social behavior, I w ill focus on outlining the 
relevant concepts Aom evolutionary theory as they pertain to behavior. Behavior is merely one 
phenotypic trait, and these concepts apply equally to all characteristics of an organism.
11 Baldwin and Baldwin (1981 ) prefer to use the "distal" as synonym for "ultimate" because of the 
misleading connotation of ultimate causation. I share their concern, but because "distal" has not 
gained wide acceptance, 1 will use the standard terminology.
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adaptive significance of this behavior? Was this behavior selected as a way o f increasing 
reproductive Gtness? Why is this behavior similar to (or diHerent from) behaviors of 
other species faced with the similar evolutionary challenges? To answer these questions 
are to seek the ultimate causes of behavior (Barash 1982). Ultimate causes are the 
explanation for why a proximate cause can occur in the 6rst place.
For evolutionary scientists, it is not sufficient to understand only the proximate causes 
or ultimate causes of behavior. The best explanation for the cause of any behavior takes 
into account both proximate and ultimate levels of causation. Ultimate cause explains 
why a proximate cause exists, and proximate causes explain immediately why a behavior 
occurs.
How Genes Influence Behavior 
Genetics and developmental biology are new sciences, and much needed research is 
still being conducted. "Given our general ignorance of the pathways between genes and 
behavior. . .  it would probably be wisest not to speak of a gene a trait but rather o f a 
ggne zn/Zwcncmg tAc proAuAz/ify occz/TTcnce q/^ a behavioral or morphological 
character" (Barkow 1989:26, italics in original). Why does biology use this speculative or 
probabilistic language? The hrst is to ward o ff any notion that biology only offers 
genetically deterministic explanations (see "Common Misconceptions o f Evolutionary 
Biology," page 30). This language is also used because o f the ideas o f single-gene eSects 
and polygenes. A  single-gene effect is an instance where one gene is responsible for a 
single attribute, usually with relative autonomy &om environmental influence. Research 
on single-gene efkcts has tended to focus on instances where a disability, such as a 
disorder like hemophilia, is linked to a single gene (Barkow 1989). Nearly all complex
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attributes of an organism's phenotype, including behavior, are the product o f multiple, co­
ordinated genes or 'polygenes.'
Even in the case of polygenes, the general model for all living things holds true, that 
an organism's phenotype is the product of genes interacting with environmental factors. 
Biology is, in actuality, the study of these interactions (ThomhiU and Palmer 2000). 
Because behavior is one characteristic of a phenotype, when studying any behavior it 
makes sense to study both the genetic and environmental contributions to that behavior. 
"The relative contributions of genotype and environment may vary considerably, but 
neither is ever equal to zero" (Barash 1982:29).
A  common misunderstanding is to think that behavior is somehow contained within a 
gene, or a particular gene programs a certain behavior. Genotypes are merely blueprints 
that, through their interaction with environmental factors, code for a range o f potential 
phenotypes. Environment, in this case, is defined broadly. Anderson, an evolutionary 
biologist, writes that "environment is used, as I believe it is generally used in biology, to 
mean all contingencies other than genes" (1979:99). Recall that epigenesis is the process 
o f interaction between the genes and the environment that results in an organism's 
phenotype. Epigenesis encompasses all o f the biological processes of an organism, "from  
the moment that RNA is transcribed 6om DNA, then forward through all phases of 
development to the final assembly of tissues and cognition itself; the interacting 
environment Erst is composed entirely of the cell medium but then expands until— in the 
case of human beings especially— it includes all aspects of culture" (Lumsden and 
Wilson 1981:370).
In  some cases, the environmental influences on how a gene codes for a particular 
phenotypic trait is very low, leaving little room for learning or experience. In  other cases,
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the geneEc contribution can be so general as to leave almost all o f the phenotypic 
development the result of environmental factors. "Among human beings, for example, the 
blink reflex is highly specified by our genetic makeup whereas personality is largely 
determined by experience" (Barash 1982:30). Just like any other characterisEc of a 
phenotype, behavior can evolve by natural selecEon.
If  understanding the mechanisms by which genes influence behavior is difEculf 
thinking about it Eom a developmental standpoint may o fkr a more clear perspecEve:
The DNA of which genes are composed specifies the producEon of proteins, leading to 
the various structures constituting an organism. These structures include hone, muscle, 
gland, and nerve cells. Behavior unquesEonably arises as a consequence of the activity 
of nerve cells, which presumably are suscepEhle to speciEcaEon by DNA, just as any 
other cells. Accordingly, insofar as genes specif the organizaEon of nerve cells, just as 
they specify the organizaEon of bone cells, there is every reason to accept a role for 
genes in producing behavior, just as we accept the role of genes in producing structure.
As phenotypes go, behavior may be somewhat more Eexible or suscepEhle to 
environmental influences than are most other phenotypes. But the relevance of geneEcs 
to behavior is undeniable, and since evoluEon is the pnmary force responsible for the 
geneEc makeup of living thiogs, evoluEon must also be relevant to behavior. (Barash 
1982:34)
EvoluEonary biology makes clear that genes do inEuence behavior. But genes only 
work at a molecular level, and behavior results Eom acEon by our muscles and nervous 
system and so on. Determining Aow genes inEuence behavior is an exEaordinanly 
difEcult task for gencEcists and developmental biologists who are only at the beginning 
o f this quest even for simple organisms. Knowledge that genes inEuence behavior is "not 
the same as knowing how that gene w ill funcEon in any of a potenEaUy vast array of 
envEonments" (Alcock 2001:46). EvoluEonary biologists need not have all the
12 It is diSicult, even for biologists, to understand the mechanism of how genotypes affect behavioral 
phenotypes; yet the held of evoluEonary biology that specializes in this area, behavior geneEcs, 
has accumulated overwhelming empincal evidence demonstrating the correlaEon between genes 
and behavior for a wide vanety of animal species, including humans.
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developmental details— how genomes and environments become phenotypes— ^be&re 
proposing and testing hypotheses about geneEc influences on behavior.
The disEnction between knowing that genes influence behavior and knowing 
precisely how or precisely which genes afkct parEcular behaviors leads into the next 
section where 1 w ill address some criEcisms of evoluEonary biology.
Common MisconcepEons of EvoluEonary Biology
^ Geng For...
One impediment to understanding evoluEonary biology is the noEon that there are 
genes for parEcular behaviors. From the preceding secEon, it is clear to see why this idea 
is in error. Any behavior is actually a complex phenomenon that requires analysis on 
many influencing factors, not just attnbuEon to one simplisEc cause. Nevertheless, this 
has become a popular idea. A  recent Popular Science arEcle claims that embryoinc stem 
cell research could "tell us what each and every gene actually does" (Weed 2003). The 
New York Times Magazine ran a story about a possible gene that prevents heart disease, 
sEoke, and diabetes (Dominus 2004). There is an ongoing discussion about the genes for 
alcohohsm, violence, musical abiUty, et cetera. The list is nearly endless, but research 
supporting such ideas is often tentaEve and couched in language Eke 'supports the idea 
that genes regulate' or 'suggests a geneEc basis for'— far Eom the determinisEc language 
'a gene E r' a behavior.
The converse of this argument, that no gene has been found to cause a parEcular 
social behavior, is often used by cnEcs of evoluEonary biology. "No one has ever been 
able to relate any aspect of human social behavior to any parEcular gene or set o f genes" 
(LewonEn, Rose, and Kamin 1984:251). The mistake here is to conclude 'That an
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aAsence evzJence on the geneEc fonndaEon of human social behavior consEtutes 
evzùknce _/br the noninvolvement of genes in the development of our sociality. " (Alcock 
2001:52, italics in onginal). Alcock goes on to explain that "the shortage of detailed 
infbrmaEon on gene-behavior relationships arises Eom the complexity o f these 
relaEonships and the resulting diEiculty in establishing which genes are doing what, and 
not because genes are irrelevant when it comes to the development of behavior" (p. 53).
I f  the pomt has not been made already, then try to Eüow the logic o f the 'no gene E)r 
a parEcular social behavior' argument as it might apply to a non-behavioral phenotypic 
Eait. Biologists have not idenEEed which genes cause the development of our heart and 
lungs (cause, of course, meaning to provide the hEbrmaEon that is responsible E»r the 
development o f our heart and lungs). Are we then to suggest that in the absence o f these 
genes our cardiopulmonary system would be the same?
'Things that are natural iu ongin should not be changed, because natural things are 
good. ' This is the naturalisEc fallacy. It should be noted that this type o f reasoning is not 
conEned to those studying evoluEonary biology, but rather, it is a widely-held assumpEon 
by those who fancy nature but misunderstand biology. Popular examples abound, and the 
naturahsEc fallacy oEen can be found lurking in the promotion o f many envEonmental 
and poliEcal movements, such as Greenpeace, The Sierra Club, or the Libertarian Party 
For example, Greenpeace's "goal is to ensure the ability o f the Earth to nurture life in all 
its diversity." The Sierra Club büls itself as "iuspEed by nature." The Libertarian Party 
promotes a governing system that stems Eom "the laws of nature and o f nature's God." 
The naturalisEc fallacy can also be found in issues related to nuEiEon and health. Arluke
13 This is not meant to be an indictment or promotion of any organizaEon.
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and Sanders (1996) provide an unexpected example; in the 1930s and 1940s, the Nazi 
party in Germany promoted vegetarianism as a natural way of living.
The refutahon of this fallacy is plain enough. In  nature, "there are diseases, plagues, 
parasites, in&nt mortality, and a host of other natural events which we try to eliminate or 
reduce" (Buss 1994:16). Rarely w ill you End someone arguing that these things, because 
they are in nature, ought to exist. "The search for morahty in nature has led to 
sentimentalizing and romanEcizing nonhuman animals and preliterate peoples . . .  Some 
anthropologists imply that anything that occurs in preliterate society— i^nfanEcide, 
geronEcide, war6re, muElaEon— i^s 'good' because it 'funcEons' to promote stabEity in a 
culture, society, or ecosystem" (Symons 1979:61).
EvoluEonary biologists do not argue that we ought to accept nature, but cEEcs oEen 
misinterpret the descEpEons of what nature is like as an endorsement o f What ought to be. 
"Because there is an evoluEonary ongin. . .  does not mean that we must condone or 
perpetuate it" (Buss 1994:17). Dawkins explains, " I am not advocating a morality based 
on evoluEon. I am saying how things have evolved" (1976:3). There is a distincEon 
between what we beheve ü  the way things are and what we believe owgAt to be the way 
things are.''* Biologists rarely commit the naturalisEc fallacy, but are often accused o f it. 
GeneEc DerermznEm
Closely related to the naturalisEc fallacy is the noEon of geneEc determinism: 'Our 
genes cause us to behave in some Exed, programmed way, and thus our behavior is 
natural and immutable.' It is a faüacy "to suppose that geneEcally inhented traits are by 
deEniEon Exed and unmodiEable" (Dawkins 1976:3). EvoluEonary biologists sEess the 
inseparable and equaüy important contnbuEons of genes and envEonmental factors in the
14 For a philosophical treatise on this disEncEon, see Moore (1903).
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development of all Eaits, including culturally learned behaviors. "Our genes may instruct 
us [to behave certain ways]. . .  but we are not necessarily compelled to obey them all our 
lives" (Dawkins 1976:3). Genes on then own do nothing at all because "the infbrmaEon 
they contain cannot be expressed in the absence of many other chemicals, aU of which are 
environmentally supplied" (Alcock 2001:43). Genes influence, not determine, behavior; 
sociobiology is built on this premise (Alcock 2001; WiEenbenberger 1981).
That this misconcepEon of evoluEonary biology is so widespread is parEcularly 
interesting because nearly aU researchers believe— a^nd in then works go into great detail 
to explain why—this idea is inaccurate. John Maynard Smith, one of the most respected 
and accomplished evoluEonary theonsts of our time, conclusively states that geneEc 
determiiEsm is "an incorrect idea that is largely irrelevant, because it is not held by 
anyone, or at least not by any competent evoluEonary biologist" (Maynard-Smith 
1997:524).
MMwnEgrsmnEmg f  roxzmarg nzzE L/ZEmare TavgZs q/"C<3z/.ynEoM
Although nearly every major work in evoluEonary biology duly refutes geneEc 
determ inism and the closely-related naturalisEc fallacy, these misconcepEons are still 
held by some social scienEsts. One explanaEon is that "ultimate and proximate causaEon 
EequenEy are confbunded: 'produced by natural selecEon' is equated with 'iim ate,' and 
an evoluEonary view of humans is thought, erroneously, to imply that aEempts at social 
reform are doomed" (Symons 1979:59). A  clariEcaEon, then, would seem to be in order.
Understanding proximate and ultimate levels of causaEon can be Eoublesome for a 
number of reasons. "Our cognitive and pereeptual mechanisms have been designed by 
natural selecEon to perceive and think about events that occur in a relaEvely limited time- 
span" (Buss 1994:16). It is easy to conceptualize the proximate causes of behavior;
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evoluEon, however, takes place gradually over many generaEons. Because we do not 
experience them happening, ultimate causes of behavior are more difEcult to grasp, and 
as such they are someEmes dismissed.
Other times, ultimate causes are mistaken for proximate causes. "This is why the 
explanaEon that a behavior exists because it was favored by selecEon (an ultimate 
hypothesis) is oEen mistakenly seen as an altemaEve to the explanaEon that learning is 
involved in the occurrence of the behavior (a proximate hypothesis)" (ThomhiU and 
Palmer 2000:111). Proximate and ulEmate levels of explanaEon are dependent upon one 
another; when a proximate-level explanation for a behavior assumes an implausible 
ulEmate-level explanaEon, evoluEonary biologists can be assured that this incompaEbiUty 
requires further invesEgaEon. But those who misunderstand these two levels of causaEon 
may inadvertenEy reject the need to saEsfy both proximate and ultimate levels of 
causaEon, leading them to accept dubious causes E)r behavior. One such example is the 
Oedipus complex proposed by Freud. "Because of the reduced viability of offspring 
produced by mating of elose relaEves, close inbreeding is selected against. Thus, Freud 
postulated as fundamental to human nature a trait that simply cannot exist" (ThomhiU and 
Palmer 2000:112).
AZeoZogy
Upon this Arst, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must 
desire to leam, and in so desiring not be saEsAed with what you already incline to 
think, there follows one coroUary which itself deserves to be inscnbed upon every wall 
of the city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry. (Peirce 193 la:56)
In  spite of overwhelming and convincmg arguments by evoluEonary biologists 
against the afbremenEoned misconcepEons (including both technical and lay 
explanaEons), these misconcepEons are sEU held by some critics. One possible reason for
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this is because evoluEonary biology may conflict with some ideological beliefs. CriEcs 
may hold these or other mistaken ideas about evoluEon not because they misunderstand 
the concepts, but instead use these ideas when criEquing evoluEonary research as a means 
o f undermining it for ideological reasons.
Historians of science would point out that ideological-based cnEques have always 
accompanied work in evoluEonary theory, even as early as the publication o f Darwin's 
OrzgfM q/"tAg ;i^ ggzg.y. Venable (1966) summarizes Engels's criEque of natural selecEon: 
"In short, far Eom supporting Marxism, this theory merely serves, if  Eansferred back 
Eom natural history into the society Eom which it was originally borrowed, to eternalize 
and justdy as though grounded in nature itself, the barbarous economic relaEons of the 
parEcular historical epoch of bourgeois capitalism" (p. 64).
While poliEcs and science oEen seem to be inseparable, it is E)r the betterment of 
both to be able to discuss each as conceptually distinct. Science has been used to ju sti^  
political ideologies, and poliEcal ideologies have at times determined the content of 
j'czg/iE.yEc research (viz. Social Darwinism and Lysenkoism )."  Nonetheless, more oEen 
the culprit is science's associaEon with the poliEcal ideology, not the content of the 
science. "Should we abandon the germ theory of disease because the Nazis used it to 
jusEfy then anE-SemiEsm?" (Johnson 2002:14).
When we End a scienEEc position manifestly misrepresented in order to criEcize it, 
ideology may be lurking nearby. This type of straw-man argument is evidenced here in an 
arEcle in the journal S'ocmZ Text. It is a vaiiaEon on the 'gene E»r' argument, couched in 
obscuranEst language:
] 5 Ruse (2000) provides a useful overview of the bistoncal misuses of evolutionary theory.
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The interaction of an organism with its own geneEc structure is only one o f the crucial 
determinants of its course of development and transfbrmaEon. Its two environments—  
its own species and the ecosystem of which it is a part—are intnnsic to both its 
survival, growth, and transfbrmaEon. Thus, controTy to c/owszcof both the
spaEaliiy and temporality of life fbrms is essenEally indeterminate &om the perspecEve 
of the geneEc code. (Aronowitz 1996:181, emphasis added)
But classical genetics (indeed, all o f biology) is weE-aware that genes and
environments are the two sides to the same developmental coin; in fact, the importance of
the "two environments" is a scientiGc discovery, not a contribuEon by a social
construcEvist's commentaiy on biology. Why the blatant misuse? Two possibiliEes exist:
It was either unintentional because of a lack of actual knowledge of biology. Or, it was
intenEonal in order to undermine biology for ideological reasons. The laEer is more
likely; the arEcle was Eatured in the 'Science Wars' issue of &czaZ Tex/ in which social
construcEvists responded to the cnEcism of Gross and LeviE's FfgAer (see
"De&nding Science" p. 8), a book that charged "cultural studies cntiques o f science [of
being] Eddied with iucompetence" (Boghossian 1998:23).'^
But cEEcism of evoluEonary biology on ideological grounds can even come Eom
within the scientiEc discipline. "As working scienEsts in the Eeld of evoluEonary
geneEcs and ecology, we have been aEempEng with some success to guide our own
research by a conscious apphcaEon of Marxist philosophy" (Lewontin and Levins
1976:34) How to adjudicate between research and ideological belief, when they come
into conflict, seems to be clear: "There is nothing in Marx, LeiEn or Mao that is or that
can be in contradicEon with the parEcular physical :^ ts  and processes o f a parEcular set
o f phenomena in the objecEve world" (p. 59). That this thinking comes Eom Richard
Lewontin, one of the foremost authoEEes on evoluEonary biology, at Harvard University,
16 It is a telling irony that Sokal's parody (1996) was included in this issue as well.
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reminds us that ideology and science may sometimes coexist, but only uncom&rtably. 
Separatiog the two may leave them both for the better.
Feminism is another example where tension can exist between ideology and science. I 
w ill use the example of the feminist biologist Tang-Martinez as illustrative o f this 
conflict. Tang-Martinez rejects sociobiology, asserting that it is "neither relevant nor 
necessary to understanding or ending the oppression of women. The otjecEons raised by 
Eadihonal feminists . . .  are both methodological and ideological" (1997:117). She 
accuses sociobiology of being "biologically determinisEc and serves only to jusEfy and 
promote the oppression of women" (p. 117). What is accompEshed by invoking this 
misconcepEon?'^  It is clear that Tang-MarEnez, a pracEcing biologist, understands the 
faEaciousness of the argument. She rejects sociobiology as biologically determinist 
because it is unfavorable to feminist ideology, but she does not reject sociobiology when 
its use is ideologicaEy favorable. In fact, she goes on to write that some feminist 
biologists "use sociobiological methodology and analysis in an attempt to understand the 
origins of male dominaEon and female oppression. . .  [so that] by understanding the 
evoluEonary ongins of male dominance, we wiE be able to formulate more effecEve 
responses to counteract Emale oppression" (p. 118, itahcs in onginal). It now becomes 
clear what can be accomplished by marrying science and ideology: one can accept what is 
ideologicaEy beneEcial and undermine the rest that conEicts. I f  femiiEsm is a poEEcal 
ideology of what ongA/ to be—that is, "the eradicaEon of male dominance and female 
oppression" (p. 119)— and evoluEonary biology a science o f W iat is, then again I argue 
that separating the two may leave them both for the better.
17 The use of "biological determinism" and "genetic determinism" here are synonymous.
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CHAPTERS
SOCIOBIOLOGY
The biological theones of human social behavior fall under the rubnc of sociobiology. 
The publicaEon of Edward O. Wilson's S'ocioAzoZogy." TAe ZView 5^/Aesis (1975) is 
regarded as a watershed event, because it was WEson's book that first synthesized the 
existing theoreEcal work by biologists and animal-studies by ethologists into a new 
discipline for the study of animal social behavior (Maxwell 1991). WEson's book is a 
"massive summary review of the research of other scienEsts who have employed 
Darwinian evoluEonary theory to make sense of social behavior" (Alcock 2001:16). In  
5'oczoAzo/ogy, WEson accomplished a monumental scienEEc task: he was able to digest 
the existing evoluEonary literature on social behavior, organize it clearly, and explain 
how the existing research on social behavior made sense in Eght of evoluEonary theory 
(Alcock 2001). He also gave a label to this new Eeld of evolutionary biology: 
sociobiology. Sociobiology is, by WEson's own deEniEon, "the systemaEc study of the 
biological basis of all social behavior" (Wilson 1975:4).
W ith the publicaEon of 5'oczoAzo/ogy. TAe ZVew Sj/n/Acf», thus began the great 
sociobiology debate that raged through much o f the 1970s and 1980s. Sociobiology was 
criEcized on poliEcal grounds as reifying conservaEve values and legitimizing racism and 
sexism (Lewontin, Rose, Kamin 1984). But Sociobiology was also criEcized on scientiEc 
grounds as reducEonist and determinisEc. "Social scientists bitterly disputed Wilson's 
claims, found faults with his methods, and dismissed his explanaEons as speculaEve
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stones" (Laland and Brown 2002:4). Balanced analysis of the work on its scienEEc ments 
was scarce. John Maynard Smith, one of leading evoluEonary biologists at the Eme, 
commented in his review of that Wilson made "a major contribuEon" to an
understanding of animal behavior and careEdly reviewed its many posiEve features 
(Maynard Snnth 1975:496). But Maynard Smith also pointed out that given the 
misappEcation of biological theones in the past (Eke scientiEc racism and Nazism), one 
must be very conscious of creating a work that could foster the inappropnate uses of 
biology. His iniEal atEtude toward Wilson's book was "one o f considerable annoyance 
and distress" (Segerstrale 2000:241).
It is far outside the intent of this paper to delve into the details o f the sociobiology 
debate. Complete and impaiEal Eeatments of the parEcipants, concepts, issues, and 
history— i^ncluding both the scientiEc and poEEcal aspects o f the debate— h^ave been 
wriEen (see Alcock 2001; Ruse 2000; Segerstrâle 2000). For our purposes, it is enough to 
know that in the scientiEc commuinty, sociobiology has become a weU-established and 
widely-accepted discipline for studying arnmal social behavior. Sociobiology has done 
much to outlast its criEcs and is now an estabEshed branch of evoluEonary biology. In  
fact, in 1989 the intemaEonal Animal Behavior Society took an informal poU of its 
ofEcers and feUows. They rated Wilson's 5'ocmAmZogy as the most important book on 
animal behavior o f aU Eme (Segerstrale 2000). In  the Efteen years since, sociobiologists 
have continued to accumulate successful research that has secured their posiEon as 
pracEEoners of a legitimate and mature scientiEc discipline.
We should be clear about what sociobiologists actually study and the type of research 
they are engaged in. Sociobiology is the study o f the evoluEonary origins of social 
behavior. It is just one branch of evoluEonary biology, a broader Eeld concerned with the
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evoluEonary caztygj: of all components o f li& — l^ike physiology, psychology, anatomy, 
geneEcs. Evolutionary biology, in turn, is just one branch of the overarching science of 
biology—the study of all living things and life processes.
When analyzing any behavior, there are really four types of quesEons we can ask 
about that behavior. We may ask: What are its immediate (or proximate) causes? In  what 
ways does this behavior develop over the individual's life-span? What is the funcEon of 
this behavior that caused it to be favored by natural selecEon? Finally, what is the 
evoluEonary history of this behavior, that is, what are its ultimate causes?
Asking the Erst quesEon about the proximate causes of a behavior is really asking 
about how the internal mechanisms of an organism work. Answering this quesEon is the 
domain of cellular biology and neurophysiology. The second quesEon, about the 
development of a behavior in the individual's Efe-span, is one that developmental biology 
most suitably answers. It is the third and fourth quesEons, about the funcEon and 
evoluEonary history of a behavior, that most concerns sociobiologists. "Sociobiology is 
pnmanly concerned with the adapEve signiEcance of behavior; that is, its ulEmate 
causaEon, as opposed to proximate factors" (Barash 1982:45). Despite each discipEne's 
abUity to explain in detaE one aspect of a behavior, no explanaEon o f any behavior can be 
complete without integrating the answers to all 6)ur types of quesEons. The value o f 
sociobiology is that, of all the biological disciplines, it can provide answers to the 
questions we deem most relevant concerning our social behavior. That is, why do humans 
act the way they do? In order to End out the evoluEonary history and causes of our 
behavior, we need to understand the sociobiological way of answering this quesEon.
One conceptual tool for understanding the evoluEonary history o f traits, including 
behaviors, is taking the gene's eye view for hypothesis generaEon and testing. Dawkins
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introduced this way of reasoning in TAe &eÿzsA Gene (1976), and it has since become an 
important tool in evoluEonary biology. The idea is that we should imagine the perspecEve 
o f the gene, whose only desire is to propel itself (through replicaEon) into the next 
generaEon of hosts. Genes that tend to influence their hosts into doing things that aid in 
their reproducEon are more successful genes. A  gene is selected on one criteria: "its 
average effecEveness in producing individuals able to maximize the gene's representaEon 
in future generaEons" (Williams 1966:251). This is what Dawkins means when he 
descnbes genes as being selEsh. I f  we think about the phenotype of an organism (which is 
caused by its genes interacting with the environment), by taking the gene's eye view we 
can see that many phenotypic characteristics of the organism funcEon to beneEt the 
replicaEon of genes. Thus we can form hypotheses about why different species evolved 
the way they did by thinking about how the evoluEonary history o f the species was 
beneEcial to its current geneEc makeup.
At this point, we should take a step back and recognize that Dawkins is using gene's 
eye view reasoning as a metaphoncal way of thinking about evoluEon, not literally.
Genes may appear selfish, but they do not uc/ a;g/^ A/y; whüe only one allele may secure a 
place on a chromosome, this does not mean that genes are and although
mulEplying prodigiously is one characterisEc of a successEil unit o f repEcaEon, Dawkins 
is not implying that genes have an actual to see themselves reproduce. These are 
merely terms that humans use to help explain the course of gene evoluEon. Genes do 
nothing except code for proteins that, in turn, shape the phenotype of an organism. 
VariaEons in phenotypes allow for differenEal reproducEve success, and hence, the 
evoluEonary process. "The environment is the ultimate natural selector" (Barash 
1982:16). What Dawkins is saying is that if  we use gene's eye view reasoning,
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evoluEonary biology has a powerful tool for understanding how adaptaEons emerge and 
proliferate in the evoluEonary history of a species.
One central issue of sociobiology is explaiinng altruism. Altruism, in biology, has a 
speciEc meaning: an individual's behavior is said to be altruisEc if  it increases another's 
chances o f survival and reproducEon while decreasing its own chances (Alcock 2001 ; 
Dawkins 1976; Laland and Brown 2002). Because behaviors that decrease the chance of 
survival o f should be selected against, the quesEon emerges: how can such behavior have 
evolved? The answer is kinship, and it can best be understood by taking the gene's eye 
view. Because an offspring receives half o f its genes from each parent, the geneEc 
relatedness of parent to offspring is 0.5— that is, each parent and the offspring w ill share 
50 per cent of their genes. Two siblings also have a geneEc relatedness of 0.5 because 
half o f each siblings genes come Eom each their mother and father.'^  The relatedness of 
other relaEves can be calculated as well: oEspring and grandparent, 0.25; two cousins,
0.125; and so on. This measure of geneEc relatedness is the probabihty that any two 
relaEves w ill possess the same gene.
The reproducEve Etness of an organism is its ability to survive and reproduce 
successfully. But if  relaEves share many o f the same genes, Eom the selEsh gene's 
perspecEve, reproducEve Etness should include not only the organism in which it is being 
carried but also aU its relaEves that may also be carrying a copy of the gene. The term 
inclusive Etness is the idea that both the individual's reproducEve success and the 
reproducEve success of relaEves is important Eom the perspecEve o f the gene.
18 Siblings have a genetic relatedness of 0.5, but they only ftarü/ica/Zy share 50 per cent of their 
genes. Due to the random assignment of genes during meiosis, siblings have an equal likelihood of 
acquiring any particular gene Eom either parent. But their geneEc relatedness may actually be 
greater or less due to this random acquisiEon.
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I f  altruistic behavior reduces an individual's reproductive Etness at the expense of 
raising another's reproductive Etness, then in the interest o f the survival o f the gene, there 
are instances where altruism is evoluEonaiily beneEcial. I f  the geneEc relatedness of two 
organisms is 0.5, and one individual does an altruisEc behavior for this relaEve, then the 
altruist has a 50 per cent chance that it wiU be beneEEng its own genes in the relaEve. 
That is, the probabihty of an altruisEc behavior beneEting shared genes is the same as the 
measure o f geneEc relatedness. SelecEon for an altruisEc behavior wEl occur if  the cost 
o f acting altruisEcaUy is less than this probabihty of beneEt to the relaEve. Or put another 
way, selecEon far altruisEc behavior wEl occur vAen the probabihty of beneEEng shared 
genes outweighs the cost of the behavior.
The idea of altruism beneEting the genes held in common between relaEves is known 
as kin selecEon. Kin selecEon describes "selection that takes account of other relaEves as 
weh as immediate descendants . . .  and can be generally applied to any situaEon in which 
an individual behaves in apparently altruisEc ways towards closely related kin to enhance 
their reproductive Etness" (Laland and Brown 2002:78). The occurrence of altruistic 
behavior is conEngent upon the geneEc relatedness of the two individuals involved, and 
in addiEon to altruisEc behavior, many of the other key concepts in sociobiology deal 
with the weighing of the costs and beneEts.
EvoluEonary game theory is another way o f thinking about behavioral patterns. A 
behavioral poEcy that is governed by geneEc factors, and hence is innate or pre­
programmed, is said to be a behavioral strategy. In  a populaEon individuals act according 
to various strategies. For example, one strategy may be 'always steal food', another might 
be 'always share food', and a third might be condiEonal, 'share food with those who are 
willing to share in return, but attack those who try to steal food'. There are many different
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possible strategies, but over the evolutionary course of a population, one set of strategies 
may be the most beneûcial and impenetrable by individuals employing other strategies. 
Take, for example, the three strategies just mentioned. In  a population o f only food 
thieves, starvation would be rampant and the survival rate of such a population would 
quickly reach zero. In a population of food sharers, everyone would benefit equally until 
one food thief migrated into the population; at this point, the thief would benefit at the 
expense of all the sharers. The thief has a greater reproductive fitness and in turn, over 
passing generations, more and more members of the population are thieves until ÊnaUy it 
is a population of all thieves and can no longer be sustained. But take the third strategy: 
sharing food would beneSt the population until a thief arrives, but as soon as the thief is 
discovered, it would be attacked and driven away. This strategy tends to encourage 
sharing and discourage theft and remains stable over many generations. Such a strategy is 
known as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), and the study of ESS is one o f the 
cornerstones of sociobiological research (Dawkins 1976; Maynard Smith 1982).
One ESS seems to be special. It is what Robert Trivers, in a 1971 paper, named
reciprocal altruism:
He suggested that, if  unrelated individuals interacted over an extended period of time, 
an altruistic behaviour which was initially costly to the actor but beneficial to the 
recipient could be selected if  this were a high probability that the altruistic act would be 
reciprocated between the two individuals on a future occasion. Over time, both 
individuals would gain more than if they had not cooperated at all. (Laland and Brown 
2002:83)
Because of the possibility o f cheats, there is a difhculty to overcome before reciprocal 
altruism can evolve as an ESS. It would likely occur only when the each individual can 
maintain a memory of the interaction, so that those who cheat and do not reciprocate
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would be remembered and not receive altruism in the future. The idea o f reciprocal 
altruism can help explain the selection for altruistic behavior outside of the kin relation.
W ith these conceptual tools— gene's eye view, inclusive fitness, kin selection, 
evolutionary stable strategies, reciprocal altruism— sociobiology has many ways of 
explaining social behavior. The central principle of sociobiology is that individuals w ill 
tend to behave in ways that w ill be most successful in passing on copies of their genes 
into the next generation. But underlying this is the premise that, insofar as behaviors can 
be shaped by evolution, it is in the environment in which those behaviors evolved that the 
behaviors should allow for maximum reproductive success. (Barash 1982; Wilson 1975). 
Sociobiology, then, still must take into account Ihe environmental context in which genes 
and individuals operate.
Human Sociobiology 
W ith the introduction of Wilson's researchers in evolutionary biology
had a new methodology and body of literature to draw upon. I f  sociobiology was the 
systematic study o f the biological basis of all social behavior, why should these new 
methods not be applied to human social behavior? Forerunners of this new human 
sociobiology were scientists like George C. Williams, Robert Trivers, John Maynard 
Smith, and W illiam  Hamilton (Laland and Brown 2002).
In  coigunction with S'ocioAmlogy, it was the work o f Richard Dawkins, an Oxford 
zoologist, that lead to the explosion of research in human sociobiology. In  human 
sociobiology, the most relevant question is, "Why are people?" As incongruous as this 
question sounds, it is really a way of asking how we have come to be what we are now 
and why we behave the way we do. Dawkins begins 7%e S'eZ/lfA Gene (1976) by
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pondering the answer to this question. Human sociobiology seeks to uncover the ways 
humans were developed by evolution and how evolved behavioral strategies influence our 
behavior.
Wilson argues "that the human species is prescribed to some extent but also displays 
some genetic differences among individuals. As a consequence, human populations retain 
the capacity to evolve still further in their biological capacity for social behavior" 
(1978:3-4).'^  Wilson outlines the h)ur characteristics of human sociobiology:
1. Sjoecz/zcity q/'Au/nan socW AcAnvzor. Human behavior exhibits great cultural diversity. 
However, this variation comprises only a small subset of aU of the social behavior 
variation exhibited by all species on earth.
2  f/ry/oggzzetzc rg7zzrzoMj^ /zzp& Our social arrangements most closely resemble animals 
with which we share a common ancestry and close genotypic relation. Since we share a 
common ancestry, for our social arrangements to resemble those of monkeys and apes 
is to be expected, only " if human social behavior is still constrained to some extent by 
genetic predispositions in behavioral development" (1978:4).
3. Cozz/brnzzry to joczoAzo/ogzca/ iAeo/};. I f  there are genetic constraints on human 
behavior, the sciences that form the foundation of sociobiology— t^hat is, population 
genetics and ecology— can be applied to the explanation of human social organization.
4. Gezzeizc vnrzzzizozz wzt/zzzi i/zg jpeczea^ . Biochemical and genetic analysis has revealed 
that point mutations on the human chromosome and chromosomal aberrations affect 
behavior, affect mental capacity, and alter motor ability. Wilson calls attention to 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome and Turner's syndrome. "More complex forms of human
19 The evidence supporting such a claim, Wilson argues, can be found in Chagnon and Irons (1979), 
Freedman (1979), and others; a detailed analysis of the assertion, however, lies outside the scope 
of this paper.
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behavior are almost certainly under the control o f polygenes (genes scattered on many 
chromosome loci), which in turn create their effects through alternating a wide array of 
mediating devices, from elementary neuronal wiring to muscular coordination and 
'mental set' induced by hormone levels" (1978:5).
"My overall conclusion 6 om the existing information," Wilson summarizes, "is that
TTbnzo fqpienf is a typical animal species with reference to the quality and magnitude of
the genetic diversity afkcting its behavior. 1 also believe that it w ill soon be w ithin our
ability to locate and characterize specific genes that alter the more complex forms of
social behavior" (1978:6-7).
Human sociobiology added one additional principle to these four that would aid the
research on specific mechanisms of human behavior. It is the validity o f comparing
humans to other animal species. The logic of such a comparison is summarized in the
following argument:
I f  two species are very closely related, they have a very recent common ancestor, that 
is, one that lived a few million years previously, hom which they will have inherited a 
large number of genes. Some of the ancestral genes that both lineages have received are 
likely to remain unchanged over a relatively short time, geologically speaking, and 
therefore could be responsible for some of the shared attributes between the species.
Detailed similarities between two very closely related species could therefore be the 
product of shared ancestry and need not have evolved zWepgWgMt/y hom diherent 
genetic backgrounds. If  so, we can use the similarities between these carefully selected 
species to infer what traits were present in their shared ancestor, one step back in these 
species' history. (Alcock 2001:75-6)
Using the tools of sociobiology to study human behavior has been used in the past to
much success. Trivers described the conflicts between parents and offspring as a result of
their differences in genetic relatedness (1972; 1974). By using the concepts o f kin
selection and gene's eye view, a novel approach to understanding such conflicts emerges.
(Although Trivers introduced his ideas of parent-offspring conflict before Dawkins
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popularized the gene's eye view for hypothesis generation, in their reasoning there is 
much similarity between the two.) Parents would want to dole out resources and support 
to their offspring in equal amounts, and save some resources for further reproductive 
capability, but offspring would want to get as much resources and support from parents as 
possible before having to become self-reliant. This is because, although their genetic 
relatedness is the same (0.5), the offspring, by their nature of being the forward 
generation, are more concerned with their survival and reproduction. Natural selection 
would favor traits in offspring that prompt them to get as much as possible &om parents, 
while selection would favor traits in parents that cause them to withhold resources in an 
attempt to strike a balance between current and future offspring.
Although the way parent-offspring conflict arise and functions has proved diSicult to 
investigate, "Trivers's ideas provided huge impetus for further work by biologists and led 
to a 6 esh interpretation of parent-offspring interactions in humans" (Laland and Brown 
2002:81). Evolutionary game theory and study of ESS in humans also remain two 
important ways of studying human behavior with the intent o f determining how humans 
attempt to maximize reproductive fitness given the environmental context. In  this way, 
human sociobiologists attempt to leam what the purpose of behaviors.
For a discipline to be considered scientific, one criteria it must meet is that its theories 
must be falsifiable— t^hat is, shown the conditions under which the theory is considered 
&lse (Popper 1965; Lakatos 1970). One criticism o f human sociobiology is that its 
hypotheses are un61sifiable and are no more than story-telhng for the origin o f behavioral 
traits. But sociobiologists have responded to such a charge and point out that any 
"hypothesis generates various predictions . . .  [and] one could in principle test [a] 
hypothesis much more extensively" by submitting these predictions to further teshng
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(Alcock 2001:70). Human sociobiological research takes efforts to prevent just-so story­
telling. The 6rst is to perform the vital task of testing these additional predictions or the 
consequences of a hypothesis, for if  these turn out to be inconsistent with the hypothesis, 
it is evidence that the theory may be flawed. Human sociobiologists also rely on 
comparative methods to provide support their theories. With a careful application of 
comparative methods, the hndings of one approach of biology can be applied to the 
hypothesis-testing of another. Reconciling hypotheses with evidence from the fossil 
record, behavior genetics, population genetics, and animal ethology increases the 
likelihood that human sociobiological explanations are true and not merely plausible.
Human Behavioral Ecology 
The evolutionary science of behavioral ecology is chiefly concerned with identh^dng 
the links between ecological factors and a(%)tive behaviors. Behavioral ecology assumes 
the following key features: "ecological selectionist logic, a 'piecemeal' analytical 
approach, a reliance on modehng, a focus on 'decision rules' or 'conditional' strategies, 
and the so-called phenotypic gambit" (Smith 2000:29). Eco/ogzcaZ .yg/ecfzoMza'f Zogzc 
means to seek out which environmental features, like resource density or competitor 
frequency, select for a particular behavior, making predictions about such selection based 
on theoretical expectations of natural selection. It  is p'feccmea/ in the sense that "complex 
socioecological phenomenon are hnitfuUy studied piece by piece— i^n a reductionist rather 
than hohstic fashion" (p. 29). DccMZOM or coMz/ztzoMaZ are ways of
explaining how behavioral variation w ill correlate with environmental variation. Finally, 
the j7/ze/zo%)zc gaz?z6zt posits that constraints on adaptation, "be they genetic, 
psychological, or social, are so minimal as to justil^ their being ignored in the
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construction of models and the testing o f hypotheses" (Laland and Brown 2002:136). 
Behavioral ecologists are not concerned whether the specific adaptations are the result o f 
genes or psychological mechanisms; what matters is that if  behavior is adaptive then it 
can be modeled and predicted (Laland and Brown 2002; Smith 2000).
Human behavioral ecologists apply the logic and assumptions o f behavioral ecology 
to studying human social behavior. In doing so, human behavioral ecologists draw several 
conclusions about human social behavior:
1. Behavioral diversity is largely a result of diversity in the contemporary 
socioecological environment (rather than in contemporary variation in genes or 
cultural inheritance, or in past environments).
2. Adaptive relationships between behavior and environment may arise horn many 
different mechanisms; hence HBE [human behavioral ecology] is generally agnostic 
about mechanisms (including the question of cognitive modularity).
3. Since humans are capable of rapid adaptive shiAs in phenotype, they are likely to be 
well-adapted to most features of contemporary environments, and to exhibit 
relatively little adaptive lag. (Smith 2000:29)
Human behavioral ecology emphasizes the flexibility o f human behavior, and tends to 
be particularly concerned with resource issues, game theory, and theories o f optimality 
(Cartwright 2000). Human beings are assumed to be able to flexibly alter their behavior 
in response to environmental conditions. Humans posses the characteristic o f high 
adaptability, which is the ability to "survive and successfully reproduce in a wide range of 
environments" (Laland and Brown 2002:114). Human behavioral ecologists use 
mathematical models o f evolutionary theory to generate and test hypotheses about human 
behavioral patterns. I f  behavior is an adaptation selected to increase reproductive Gtness, 
then given the environmental circumstances, models can be produced that predict what 
would be optimal behavioral patterns. These models can then be compared with data 6 om 
anthropological research. I f  the data 6t the predicted behavior 6 om the model, the
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hypothesis provides a relatively good explanation of the behavioral patterns, decision­
making strategies, and important environmental cues that influence behavior. I f  the data 
do not fit the model, it can be concluded that behavioral patterns in the studied population 
are not optimal to the situation.
Human behavioral ecology does not formulate theories of adaptations but "merely 
establish[es] which behaviour patterns appeared ad^tive by correlating human 
behavioural traits with reproductive success" (Laland and Brown 2002:132). As such, it 
does not clearly distinguish between adaptations and adaptiveness. An adaptation is a 
phenotypic characteristic that is selectively favored by natural selection that, because it is 
effective in  solving particular environmental challenges that the organism faces, increase 
reproductive success. A  similarly named concept, but one that is conceptually very 
different, is adaptiveness. Adaptiveness is the measure of a behavior's effect on 
reproductive success. Behaviors that increase reproductive success are said to be 
adaptive.
We can ask two questions about any behavior: Is the behavior an adaptation? Is the 
behavior adaptive? There are 6)ur possible explanations for any behavior— t^he cross of 
this two-by-two matrix of adaptations and adaptiveness. A  trivial example may help 
explain this point: the human blink reflex.^ " Let us assume lhat the blink reflex is an 
adaptation. I f  we hve in an environment where no foreign objects ever threaten to enter 
the eye (an unlikely, but hypothetical, scenario), then we might conclude that this 
adaptation no longer has a high degree o f adaptiveness— that is, it is no longer adaptive. 
That is to say that in this special environment, the blink reflex is an adaptation but is not
20 I  wish to stress that example is using the blink reflex is purely hypothetical. In no way is this meant 
to be a analysis of the blink rehex, its evolutionary origins, or current adaptiveness. It is
merely a convenient hypothetical example to use because it is familiar and helps explain the 
distinction between adaptations and ad^tiveness.
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currently adaptive. We do not live in such a sanitized environment, and we can assume 
that the environment in which the blink reflex was favored by natural selection as an 
adaptation is in many ways similar to the environment we live in today. Thus, the blink 
reflex is an adaptation and also is currently highly adaptive.
Now, let us change our minds and assume that the blink reflex is not really an 
adaptation. Instead it can be considered a by-product of another adaptation, perhaps a by­
product o f the mechanism for moistening the eye. In  the same scenario as mentioned 
above, if  we hve in an environment where nothing ever threatens to enter the eye, then in 
this case the blink reflex has a low degree of adaptiveness— t^hat is, it is not adaptive. The 
blink reflex, then, is not an adaptation and also is not adaptive. In the terminology of 
evolutionary biology, the blink reflex in this case is a dysfunctional by-product. But we 
have already agreed that our environment is not such a sterile place. Whatever the reason 
is why we blink, it is currently something that has a high degree of adaptiveness. 
Although not an adaptation, the blink reflex is adaptive. In  the terminology of 
evolutionary biology, the blink reflex in this case can be thought to be an ex^tation—the 
utilization o f a structure or feature for a function other than that for which it was 
developed through natural selection.
This example, I  hope, has made clear the distinction between adaptations and 
adaptiveness. Human behavioral ecology has been criticized for assuming that aU 
adaptive behaviors (that is, behaviors that increase reproductive success) are adaptations 
(characteristics &vored by natural selection). Human behavioral ecologists respond by 
contending that they are well aware of the distinction, but such a distinction does not 
factor into modeling behavior. It is precisely on this point that a group o f evolutionary 
scientists split with the human behavioral ecology tradition and began a new
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sociobiological approach. Donald Symons (1990) summarizes the rationale for rejecting
human behavioral ecology:
Darwinism is a historical example of the origin and maintenance of odapioAoMf, and 
almost none of the phenomena of interest to social scientists— polyandry, bridewealth, 
the avunculate, and so forth—are themselves adaptations. Whether or not they are 
adaptive, they cannot be adaptations because they are not descriptions of phenotypic 
design. Darwinism can be '^plied' to traditional social science phenomena only 
insofar as it illuminates the psychological adaptations drat underpin those phenomena.
(P .435)
Because of these criticisms and the subsequent development of the rival theory, 
evolutionary psychology, human behavioral ecology remains a small branch of 
anthropology. "Thus, while the methods o f human behavioural ecology have the 
advantage that they are quantitative, rigorous, theory-driven, and insightful," its ideas and 
empirical Hndings are underrepresented in sociobiological research (Laland and Brown 
2002:150).
Evolutionary Psychology 
Evolutionary psychology has proved to be the most huitful o f aU sociobiology 
theories. "In terms of the number of researchers, human behavioral ecology is dwarfed by 
its cousin evolutionary psychology" (Laland and Brown 2002:151). Practitioners of 
evolutionary psychology argue that since that all aspects o f humans evolved by natural 
selection, our brains "consist of a set o f adaptations, designed to solve the long-standing 
adaptive problems humans encountered as hunter-gatherers" (Cosmides and Tooby 
1997:241). Adaptations are characteristics of organisms which are the result o f selection 
in a particular functional context (West-Eberhard 1992). Whereas human sociobiologists 
and human behavioral ecologists focus their expzlanations on behavioral traits, 
evolutionary psychologists focus on the adapted psychological mechanisms to explain
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proximate and ultimate causes of behavior. Two pioneers of evolutionary psychology,
Cosmides and Tooby (1987), explain:
[I]n the rush to apply evolutionary insights to a science of human behavior, many 
researchers have made a conceptual 'wrong turn,' leaving a g ^  in the evolutionary 
approach that has limited effectiveness. This wrong turn has consisted of attempting to 
apply evolutionary theory directly to the level of manifest behavior, rather than using it 
as a heuristic guide for the discovery of iimate psychological mechanisms. (Pp. 278-9)
The adaptations that are key for an evolutionary psychological perspective are those 
that arose throughout the evolutionary history of hominids, and especially homo sapiens. 
Humans had lived in small himter-gatherer groups for around 99 per cent o f their 
existence since the emergence of Homo sapiens^  ^(Badcock 2000; Cartwright 2000;
Tooby and Cosmides 1997). Natural selection acts within the environmental conditions 
&ced by a species throughout its evolutionary history (Symons 1979). For humans, the 
environment of the Pleistocene era, a period of time 6 om 1.7 m illion to around 10,000 
years ago, is the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, or EEA (Badcock 2000; 
Bowlby 1969; Laland and Brown 2002; Tooby and Cosmides 1997). The properties of 
this ancestral world endured long enough to allow the alleles well-adapted to the 
environment to occur and flourish at high hrequencies in the the population's gene pool.
Accrual o f these successful adaptations takes a considerable amount of time. 
Evolution by natural selection is very slow, taking place gradually and incrementally over 
many hundreds of generations, in comparison to the changes that can occur in history and 
culture. In the time since the development of agriculture around 10,000 years ago, human 
culture has changed dramatically. These rapid changes leave our evolved psychological 
mechanisms lagging behind the environment faced by humans in the modem era (Laland 
and Brown 2002). Adaptations in humans were shaped by the features of our ancestral
21 The first species of the genus TTbmo evolved nearly two and a half million years ago, with the 
emergence of 7/b/Mo gopiew about 200,000 years ago.
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environment, and so "human psychological mechanisms should be adapted to those 
environments, not necessarily to the twentieth-century industrialized world" (Cosmides 
and Tooby 1987:201). When an adaptation that conferred reproductive fitness in one 
environment decreases fitness in another, evolutionary psychology identifies these traits 
as maladaptive:
The difference between current and evolutionary historical environments is especially 
important to keep in mind when one is considering human behavioral adaptations.
Today most humans live in environments that have evolutionarily novel 
components . . .  Therefore, human behavior is sometimes poorly ad^ted (in  the 
evolutionary sense of the word) to current conditions. (Thornhill and Palmer 2000:7)
Evolutionary psychology operates on the assumption that "natural selection cannot 
select for behavior per se; it can only select for mechanisms that produce behavior" 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1987:281). Psychological mechanisms include the information 
processing circuits in our brain that shape behavior, context-speciGc emotions, 
preferences, and prochvities (Laland and Brown 2002). Pinker (2002) draws together 
evidence from cognitive science, neuroscience, and genetics to support the principle held 
by evolutionary psychology that the human mind has domain-specific processing abilities 
adept at solving particular problems. Evolutionary psychologists also cite the 
anthropological work (Brown 1991) on human universals— a set o f characteristics and 
aptitudes that all cultures have in common— as evidence that "natural selection has 
endowed humans with a universal complex mind" (Pinker 2002:55).
Evolutionary psychologists argue that evolved cognitive mechanisms, at least in part, 
shape the way humans leam, reason, develop, and acquire culture (Cosmides and Tooby 
1997). These evolved cognitive mechanisms are domain-specific and are designed to 
process information 60m each content domain with the "recurrent structure of its 
characteristic problem type, as encountered under Pleistocene conditions" (Cosmides and
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Tooby 1997:243). What this means is that our brains have been shaped by natural 
selection "with a set of 'mental modules' that give us innate skills and predispositions . . .  
[like] modules for language acquisition, for face recognition, for budding basic 
taxonomies of life forms and much else" (Johnson 2002:12). Our minds have a large 
number of these mental modules that are "dedicated to finding quick and efficient 
solutions to particular problems that were of signiGcance to our ancestors" (Laland and 
Brown 2002:162).
W ith an understanding of the characteristics of the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness and its inherent adaptive problems, evolutionary psychologists can attempt to 
determine what cognidve mechanisms evolved. This is because, in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness, human hunters and gatherers had to solve speciGc problems. 
Thus this way of life was "the only stable, persistent adaptadon humans have ever 
achieved . . .  insufficient time has elapsed since the invention o f agriculture 10,000 years 
ago for signiGcant change to have occurred in human gene pools" (Symons 1979:35).
For our purposes in understanding evoluGonary psychology, Tooby and Cosmides 
provide two of its fundamental tenets: "the human mind consists of a set of evolved 
information-processing mechanisms instantiated in the human nervous system" and 
"these mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are adaptaGons, 
produced by natural selecGon over evoluGonary time in ancestral environments" 
(1992:24). EvoluGonary psychology seeks to uncover these mechanisms, postulate how 
they developed, and how they funcGon in our modem environment. Because it is easy to 
engage in armchair evoluGonary hypothesizing, evoluGonary psychologists engage in a 
number of methodological pracGces that aim to increase the validity o f their research:
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1. Use evolutionary theory as a starting-point to develop models of adaptive problems 
the human psyche had to solve.
2. Attempt to determine how these adaptive problems manifested themselves in 
Pleistocene conditions, and endeavour to establish the selection pressures.
3. Catalogue the specific information processing problems that must be solved if  the 
adaptive function is to be accomplished. Develop a computational theory.
4. Use the computational theory to determine the design features that any cognitive 
program capable of solving the problem must have, and develop models of the 
cognitive programme structure.
5. Eliminate alternate candidate models with experiments and field observation.
6. Compare die model against the pattens of manifest behavior that are produced by 
modem conditions. (Laland and Brown 2002:164)
Indeed, Tooby and Cosmides (1989) advise ns that "the desire to leapGog directly 
Gom step one to step six must be resisted if  evolutionary biology is to have any enduring 
impact on the social sciences" (p. 41). That some research in this Geld does not heed this 
warning by its main proponents is not reason to condemn the Geld in its entirety. The best 
research in evoluGonary psychology is ngorous, empincally-jusGGed, consistent with the 
knowledge and theones of related Gelds in evoluGonary biology, and provide novel ways 
of thinking about human social behavior. Laland and Brown summarize that "the 
evoluGonary psychology literature has made important confribuGons to the understanding 
of culture, decision making, emoGon, language, pregnancy, psychological illness, sexual 
behaviour and sex differences, sGgmaGzaGon, visual percepGon, and many other topics" 
(2002:195).
MemeGcs
The history o f the sociobiological literature has demonstrated that the last chapter of a 
book can cause the most controversy, as was the case with Wilson's chapter on humans in 
j5oczo6foZogy (1975, chap. 27). Richard Dawkins parGcipated in this Gend, too, when he
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inGoduced the concept of memes as a new type of replicators in the last chapter of his 
Gene (1976, chap. 11). Whereas the gene is the unit o f AzoZogzcaZ natural 
selecGon, the meme is the unit of cwZtwruZ natural selecGon. Dawkins idenGGes the 
properGes that any successGd unit of natural selecGon must have: longevity, fecundity, 
and copying-Gdelity. Genes consGtute a secGon o f a chromosome which potentially last 
for many generaGons (longevity), copy and spread rapidly (fecundity), and reproduce the 
DNA infbrmaGon faithfully (copying-Gdelity).
Using the gene as an analogy, memes, according to Dawkins, "propagate themselves 
in the meme pool by leaping Gom brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, 
can be called imitaGon" (1976:206). Memes are a unit of imitaGon. "When you imitate 
someone else, something is passed on. This 'something' can then be passed on again, and 
again, and so take on a life o f its own" (Blackmore 1999:4). This 'something' is a meme. 
I f  you retell a story that a Giend told you, but don't imitate every gesture or use the exact 
words, this sGll counts as imitaGon as long as the gist o f the story is copied. ReteUing the 
story is imitaGon; the gist o f the story is the meme. It is the smallest sufGcienGy 
distiucGve and memorable idea that can be passed on through imitaGon. Memes possess 
the same properGes of a unit o f natural selecGon that genes do. Memes GequenGy stay in 
our heads for long periods of time, they can be copied and spread rapidly, and the 
infbrmaGon is reproduced GithfuUy^ during rephcaGon.
MemeGcists often point out that not everything is a meme. ImitaGon, in memeGcs, is 
deGned in the broadest sense, "to include passing on infbrmaGon by using language, 
reading, and instrucGon, as well as other complex skills and behaviors" (Blackmore
22 More correctly, "at least some core components of some memes are reasonable faithfully
reproduced" (Laland and Brown 2002:199). Defining what constitutes an individual meme is one 
of the unsettled analytic issues in memetics. See Blackmore (1999), Dawkins (1976), Dennett 
(1995).
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1999:43). What does not count as a meme are behaviors learned throughi condiGoning, 
classical or operant; those behaviors that are contagious, hke yawning when others do, 
because we already know how to yawn and thus no infbrmaGon aAowt yawning is passed 
on in the imitaGon; and speciGc types of social learning, speciGcally, 'stimulus 
enhancement' or 'local enhancement,' in which aGenGon is drawn to the object or locale 
by the presence of another person, but the behavior that is thought to be imitated is 
actually independenGy discovered (Blackmore 1999).
MemeGcs is an example of universal Darwinism. Darwinian evoluGon requires three 
processes fbr replicators to undergo: variaGon, selecGon, and retenGon (Blackmore 1999). 
Memes confbrm to the mechanism of biological evoluGon, but operate in  a different 
medium. There is variaGon (not all memes are ahke), selecGon (some memes do beGer in 
the environment than do others), and retenGon (the 'something' that consGtutes a meme is 
inhented through imitation).
Thinking about memes is similar to thinking ahout genes. Blackmore (1999, chap. 4) 
suggests we take a meme's eye view, much as Dawkins suggested using a gene's eye 
view, in order to think about the di%renGal rephcaGon of memes. Remember that nval 
alleles compete, so to speak, for a place in an organism's genome. Genomes are 
replicated, and the allele that secured a place on the chromosome get passed on to the 
next generaGon. Memes, too, can be avals, but the structure that memes reside in and can 
ultimately contribute to a meme's rephcaGon is the human mind. "Imagine a world fu ll of 
brains, and far more memes than can possibly find homes. Which memes are more hkely 
to Gnd a safe home and get passed on again?" (Blackmore 1999:41). This is the central 
quesGon of memeGcs. SuccessGil memes are the ones that the mind selects and is passed 
on to another mind through imitaGon.
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A t this point, yon might be asking one of the more central questions of memeGcs: 
What is it good fbr? Memes are a new concept, and it is sGll unclear whether memetics 
win establish itself as a scienGGc discipline. MemeGcs is not yet widely accepted in 
academia (Blackmore 1999; DenneG 1995). One of the champions o f memeGcs, Daniel 
DenneG, concedes that "the prospects fbr elaborating a ngorous science of memeGcs are 
doubtfW" (1995:369). Why then should memetics be considered a sociobiological 
approach?
One possible answer, which may not be so pleasing to memeGcists, is that memes 
really only serve as a useful way of thinking about evoluGonary psychology. Let us think 
about what makes a meme successful. I f  our minds are the ultimate natural selector of 
memes, then what makes a successful meme gives us insight in thinking about how our 
minds work. "From the perspecGve of memeGcs, evoluGonary psychology provides a 
crucial underpinning. In order to understand why certain memes are posiGvely selected 
and others rejected we need to understand the way natural selecGon has molded our brains 
fbr the beneGt of the genes . . .  To fully understand human behavior we must consider 
both geneGc nnzZ memeGc selecGon" (Blackmore 1999:36, itahcs in original).
MemeGcists also make a grander claim that because culture is socially transmiGed 
infbrmation, memeGcs can serve as the most appropriate tool fbr studying culture. Clearly 
memes can provide us with a different way of thinking about culture and cultural 
transmission, but whether memeGcs actually provides a superior way o f analyzing culture 
remains to be seen. No complete memeGc theory of culture has been profkred by any 
proponents of memetics. Given that memeGcs is in its infancy and has litGe empirical 
work to suppoG it, at this time it would be wise to adopt only a tentaGve consideraGon fbr 
memeGcs in biosocial theones.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Gene-Culture CoevoluGonaiy Theory 
"There is only one evoluGonary approach to the study of human behavior that takes 
up the challenge of understanding genetic and cultural evoluGon simultaneously by 
focusing directly on their interacGon" (Laland and Brown 2002:242). This approach is 
vanously known as gene-culture coevoluGonary theory, gene-culture theory, or dual- 
inhentance theoryThese theones seek to uncover how our genes restrict the 
development of culture, and ask how culture evolved and how it affects evoluGon (Laland 
and Brown 2002). Gene-culture theory draws heavily Gom popuiaGon genetics and relies 
on complex mathemaGcal modeling, two hindrances that prohibit it Gom being widely 
used as a sociobiological approach. Nonetheless, an analysis of the components of the 
theory and its possible uses is necessary to complete the conceptual Gamework of current 
approaches to human behavior in the sociobiology discipline.
The approach of gene-culture theory has two main proponents and schools of thought. 
The Grst was put Girth by Lumsden and Wilson (1981) in Gewef, owZ CWfure. The 
second approach was advocated by Cavalli-Sfbrza and Feldman (1981) in CwZtwraZ 
o/Kf Evo/wGon. These approaches share many similariGes. Each use 
concepts that are similar to those used in evoluGonary psychology and memeGcs, and rely 
heavily on mathemaGcal models for hypothesis testing. But it is the work o f Cavahi- 
Sforza and Feldman that has been more widely adopted as the theoreGcal fbundaGons fbr 
this new Geld, with Lumsden and Wilson's work having been severely cnGcized and then 
Gndings oGen refuted by the Cavalli-Sfbrza theories.^  In outlining an analyGc Gamework 
of gene-culture theory, however, it remains useful to draw Gom both approaches.
23 I prefer to use "gene-culture theory" fbr the sake of concision.
24 The criticism came during the height of the sociobiology debate Gom a small group of oAen 
partisan reviewers. AddiAonally, the highly technical nature of Lumsden and Wilson's work 
hampered attempts at popularizing the theory.
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Gene-culture theory's concept of culture walks the line between behavior genetics and 
cultural constructionism. Much of what we consider culture changes too rapidly to be the 
direct result genes, but conversely, human cultural universals and different cultural 
tradidons found in similar environments belie the strict construcGonist argument. Gene- 
culture theory rejects this dualisGc stance and accepts that both "genes and environment 
undoubtedly account for some variation in human behaviour but the socially GansmiGed 
component of culture is hard to ignore" (Laland and Brown 2002:245).
CnGcal to gene-culture theory are the concepts of epigenesis and the epigeneGc rule.
Recall that epigenesis is the process of gene-environment interacGons that result in the
development of an organism's phenotype. Lumsden and Wilson (1981) define an
epigeneGc rule as follows:
Any regularity during epigenesis that channels the development of an anatomical, 
physiological, cogniGve, or behavioral trait in a particular direction. . .  Some 
epigenetic mles are inflexible, with the final phenotype being buffered from all but the 
most drastic environmental changes. Others permit a Gexible response to the 
environment. . .  In cogniGve development, the epigeneGc rules are expressed in any 
one of the many processes of percepGon and cogniGon to influence the form of learning 
and the Gansmission of culturgens. (P. 370)
An epigenetic rule explains the phenotypic result of a parGcular gene-environment 
interaction. How do epigeneGc rules relate to the thesis that genes and culture coevolve? 
Lumsden and Wilson Grst o fkr a working deGniGon of culture: "the sum total of mental 
constructs and behaviors, including the construction and employment o f arti&cts, 
GansmiGed Gom one generaGon to the next by social learning" (1981:3). They go on to 
deGne a culturgen as any Gansmissible behavior, arGfact, or mental construct. A  culturgen 
is conceptually similar to a meme, in that they are aGempts to divide culture into discrete 
units. Gene-culture coevoluGon is the change in epigeneGc rules due to shifts in gene 
Gequency, culturgen Gequency, or both joinüy. Put more simply, the makeup of the
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human phenotype in a population— r^emembering that phenotype is all the physical 
qualihes of an organism, including physiology and behavior at all levels (Lewontin 1992) 
— i^s the result of the combinaGon of both genes and cultural elements.
Cultural selecGon is the process whereby culturgens increase or decrease in Gequency 
within a popuiaGon by being adopted by individuals at diGering rates (Cavalli-Sfbrza and 
Feldman 1981; Laland and Brown 2002). Cultural selecGon can guide natural selecGon; 
individuals express differing cultural prekrences, and sometimes as a result these cultural 
preferences cause individuals to survive and Gourish at different amounts. In this way, the 
effects of cultural preference have a geneGc component. The example o f contracepGon is 
often used to explain this point. Fertility conGol is disadvantageous fbr genes in terms of 
natural selecGon m that pracGGoners typically have kwer oGspring. But contracepGon is 
oGen a popular choice, and hence conGacepGon as a culturgen is spread by its advantage 
in cultural selecGon. The advantage of gene-culture coevolution is that it can explain how 
cultural tradiGons that are non-adaptive in the biological sense can evolve. "When it has a 
sufGcienGy high cultural Gtness, cultural infbrmation could increase in Gequency despite 
the decreasing geneGc Gtness" (Laland and Brown 2002:251).
Gene-culture theonsts give three reasons why human evoluGon may be difkrent than 
other species' evolutions because of our culture. First, as seen in the example of 
conGacepGon, culture is an eGecGve means of modi:^ing the course of natural selecGon. 
Second, culture may generate ways to circumvent the regular natural selecGon process, 
like in the case where a parGcular cultural group (as opposed to individuals) are 
reproducGvely favored. Thud, because culture can affect natural selecGon, the rates of 
evoluGonary change can be speeded-up or slowed-down by culture (Laland and Brown 
2002).
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Ultimately, gene-culture theory tends to favor examining how culture affects the 
issues o f popuiaGon geneGcs and evoluGon. Cavalli-Sfbrza and Feldman (1981), pioneers 
in this approach, use the example of the development of agriculture to explain:
The dramatic increase in numbers of man with the adoption of agriculture is the most 
conspicuous testimonial of how a cultural ad^tation, and hence culture itself, can 
promote Darwinian Gtness of a species. There is no doubt that cultural mechanisms can 
be powerful adapGve mechanisms that favor survival and ulGmate reproducGon.
Cultural adaptaGon, veiy much like physiological adaptaGon, is the transfbrmaGon of 
the behavior of an individual to meet some potential demands or challenges. In the case 
of culture, this occurs through learning by imitaGon, educaGon, or related mechaiGsms 
that involve use of the pnor expenence of other individuals. (Pp. 362-3)
Our geneGc makeup, then, is not only the result of natural selecGon. It also bears the 
signature of culture's influence on our geneGc evoluGon and the current geneGc variaGon 
among populations.
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CHAPTER 4
BIOSOCIAL THEORY
Biology is the key to human nature, and social scientists cannot afïbrd to ignore its 
rapidly Gghtening principles. But the social sciences are potentially far richer in 
content. Eventually they will absorb the relevant ideas of biology and go on to beggar 
them by comparison. (Wilson 1990:260)
The intent of this research is to outline the various evolutionary approaches to human 
behavior and show how they are relevant to the social sciences. It can be argued, on the 
one hand, that sociology already adequately incorporates concepts Gom biology into its 
analyses. It does so largely by picking and choosing Gom biology only what is 
immediately useful, and even then used only when necessary. Sociologist John Kunkel 
argues just this posiGon, that "sociologists have recognized and accepted the role of 
biological kctors k r  decades, albeit impGciGy . . .  we are [not] ignorant of these 
biological parameters, but only that they are simply part of the given Gamework of human 
social life" (Kunkel 1982:283-84).
On the other hand, the laGure by sociology in recognizing the relevance of 
evoluGonary biology to its own discipline is evidence that there is still much Gom biology 
that sociology is ignorant of. There are at least two important contribuGons Gom the 
biological sciences that sociology has been slow or unwühng to accept. The Grst is a 
reGitaGon of the belief that human beings are a blank slate. Many sociologists hold on to 
the rnya view of human nature, a view that has been shown to be demonstrably 
klse and harmGG. Nonetheless, the belief that humans are bom with no innate cogniGve
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mechanisms is a widespread belief. A  modem version of the view, one that at
least in language aGempts to distance itself Gom the blank slate doctrine, is that the 
human mind is rather is like a general-purpose computer. It comes equipped with the 
ability to process information and perform fimcGons, but is "desperately dependent upon 
such extrageneGc, outside-the-skin control mechanisms" to shape behavior (Geertz 
1973:44). The conclusion Gom these two lines of reasoning is that "human nature is an 
empty vessel, waiting to be filled by social processes" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992:29).
Biology does not accept this model of the human mind. Research in cogniGve science,
neuroscience, geneGcs, and evoluGonary psychology, to name a kw , all posit the
existence of an innate human nature. In fact, to refute the premises of strict social
construcGvism,^  Tooby and Cosmides (1992) rekr to the research Gom
cogniGve psychology, evoluGonary biology, artificial intelGgence, developmental 
psychology, linguisGcs, and philosophy [that] converge on the same conclusion: A  
psychological architecture that consisted of nothing but equipotential, general-purpose, 
content-independent, or content-free mechanisms cowZd not the
tasks the human mind is known to perform or solve the adapGve problems humans 
evolved to solve. (P. 34, emphasis added)
Theones of an iimate, universal human nature are not mere rivals to the blank slate. 
They fundamentally conGadict the blank slate doctrine, provide ample evidence why it is 
wrong, and ofkr supenor evidence that the mind actually contains a large number of 
innate, specialized mechanisms k r  cogniGve funcGoning.
Even so, the social construcGvist model is oAen favored because if  one assumes a set 
of false beliefs about biology, then strict cultural explanaGons are the only alternative.
The dearth of knowledge of biology once again provides the starGng point k r  a untenable
25 Tooby and Cosmides (1992) call this the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) and offer a 
refutation of its premises in detail.
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posiGon, as evidenced by Gns excerpt Gom a classic treaGse on social construcGvism,
Berger and Lnckmann's CowinzcGo» ReaZziy:
The human organism lacks the necessary biological means to provide stability fbr 
human conduct. Human existence, if  it were thrown back on its organismic resources 
by themselves, would be existence in some sort of chaos. Such chaos is, however, 
empincally unavailable, even though one may theoreGcaUy conceive of it  (1966:52)
Here in one passage we find nearly all the social construcGvist errors about biology. 
Human conduct is something wholly distinct Gom biology. In a state of nature, human 
existence is chaoGc. Without the stabihty provided by culture, humans are incapable of 
human social conduct. Evidence fbr this position is unavailable but is at least theoreGcaUy 
conceivable.
Each of these beliefs has been widely refuted by the scienGGc evidence. Human 
conduct and biology are related, and the development of culture is a human biological 
universal. Social organizaGon is the natural state of human existence. Human conduct is 
mediated by human nature and culture.^ '^  One can theoreGcaUy conceive of evidence to 
support Berger and Luckmann's grand claims only by being completely ignorant of the 
contradictory scienGGc raGonale and empirical evidence that biology provides.
Even so, assuming that there is no human nature is oGen favored because it is thought 
to be poUticaUy liberating. I f  there is no human nature, individuals can be infinitely 
molded as society sees Gt. AU problemaGc aspects of humanity can be solved through 
suGicient socializaGon. The absurdity of this posiGon becomes evident when Thornhill 
and Palmer (2000) point out that such a beUeG for example,
implies that women Gnd rape a negative expenence only wAem zAey ore Ay
zAgzr czz/mrg to/gg/ zAz.; wqy. I f  this were true, then stopping rape would not be 
necessary in order to solve rape as a social proA/gm. Instead, according to assumpGons
26 In addiGon to the conceptual Gamework of sociobiology provided in this paper, see Brown (1991) 
fbr an account of human universals and Pinker (2002) fbr a massive summary of the literature on 
human nature.
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of the social science explanaGon of rape, the proAZg/» of rape could be solved simply by 
teaching women ±at rape is a wonderful experience. (P. 152, italics in original)
Proponents of the blank slate oAen hold on to its indefensible empirical position 
because o f its perceived poliGcal beneGts. Its impGcaGons may not always be politically 
liberating, however. Symons notes that "a tabula rasa view of the human mind is the 
totahtarian's dream" (1979:65), and Mao Zedong wrote that "it is on a blank page that the 
most beautiful poems are wnGen" (Pinker 2002:11). The policy impGcaGons of an innate 
human nature or of the blank slate doctrine are not as clear-cut as their proponents would 
like us to beheve.
Sociology has also been slow to accept a second important contribuGon Gom the 
biological sciences: evoluGonary theory. Much of sociological theorizing denies that 
biological factors inGuence behavior and are unaware of how evoluGon shaped these 
factors. Because of this, sociology is handicapped in its efforts to explain human 
behavior. The research of this paper suggests some of the ways that biological disciplines 
have made inroads into domains tradiGonaUy associated with sociological analysis.
In 1977, the sociologist Gerhard Lenski prescienGy asked, "Why cannot cultural and 
biological explanaGons of human social behavior be combined?' (p. 74). A  biosocial 
approach aims at just such a goal. It involves incorporating the relevant data and concepts 
Gom the biological sciences into the sociological way of understanding human social 
behavior (Walsh 2003). I  want to reiterate the distincGon between biological perspecGves, 
like the sociobiological approaches outlined in the previous chapter, and biosocial 
perspecGves. The intent of the research is different between the two disciplines. 
"Sociobiology is concerned largely with interpreting behavior in ultimate terms" (Barash 
1982:29). Biosocial theones recognize that because behavior is "the continuous, mutual.
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and inseparable interaction between biology and the social environment" (Lancaster et al. 
1987:2), ihe most empirically adequate theories must integrate the relevant insights 6om  
natural and social science disciplines.
What are the characteristics of a biosocial theory? Baldwin and Baldwin (1981) give 
four criteria that must be met. The first is that a biosocial theory must "contain an 
empirically defensible mixture and interaction of genetic and environmental factors" (p. 
17)— t^hat is, not :&vor nature or nurture exclusively. As I w ill explain, sociobiological 
approaches are unwittingly biased toward nature because of misconceptions about what 
constitutes the social environment Second, "biosocial theory wiU necessarily involve 
multicausal models of behavior, with room for interaction efkcts among the numerous 
causes" (p. 17). Third, the influence of genetic and environmental factors must be 
weighted according to the species under consideration. For humans, much of our social 
behavior is the result of learning; consequently, the influence of the environment 
(including the complex social environment) must be weighted heavily in biosocial 
research. Finally, we must recognize that the influence of proximate and ultimate causes 
of behavior vary over the course of the life-span (spanning 6om prenatal development 
until death) and thus our explanations must vary accordingly.
None of this is meant to imply that culture is merely biology writ large (Barkow 
1989). Biology underlies psychology, and psychology underlies sociology. Nonetheless 
cultural experience accounts for a large portion of the variance in behavioral differences 
within and between cultures (Walsh 1995). A  biosocial approach is amenable to the broad 
diversity of Victors that influence social behavior. A  biosocial theory, then, "should 
provide an empirically defensible interweaving of multiple causal factors— involving
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
both nature and nurture" (Baldwin and Baldwin 1981:16).^ ^ The discipline of sociology 
rightly is broader than the narrow wety in which it is currently practiced. "To understand 
any particular thing in human behavior, social organization, or culture, we need to bring 
to bear the insights provided by a variety of other disciplines" (Cronk 1999:45).
Why Context Matters
"From one perspective," Buss tells us, "context is everything" (1994:15). The context 
of our evolutionary ancestors sh^ed our phenotypic adaptations, but it is in our current 
context that we live today. Understanding our current context is critical in understanding 
how our evolved phenotypes currently function. "It is realized that even a complete 
description and understanding of the genetic, hormonal, and neurological bases of 
complex behavior would not constitute a complete understanding of that behavior absent 
knowledge of cultural setting and of motives, purposes, and phenomenology of the 
individual actor" (Walsh 1995:8).
One weakness in sociobiological approaches is how they conceptualize contextual 
factors. While they are ready to concede that humans are sensitive to context and acutely 
aware of changes in contextual factors (Buss 1994; Pinker 1997; Symons 1979), because 
their data collection methods are not always suited to capturing contextual detail, often 
sociobiology research paints contextual factors with a broad stroke. Indeed, of all the 
ways of studying context by sociobiologists, ethnographic data are perhaps the best, and
27 Baldwin and Baldwin call this a balanced biosocial theory. Their work does not focus solely on 
human social behavior, but rather is broader in scope and can be "adjusted to St the species and 
behavior under analysis" (1981:16). In their opinion, evolutionary biologists had been favoring 
genetic factors in their explanations. Adding the descriptor 'balanced' to the label 'biosocial' is a 
call for researchers to consider a fairer mixture of both genetic and environmental factors. In the 
case of the social sciences, the label seems to be redundant. No discipline advocates abandoning 
research on environmental factors. Any serious biosocial approach to human behavior should seek 
to incorporate relevant concepts from both natural and social science disciplines. In this case, 
'balance' will be a characteristic of these ^proaches, and consequently the label can be omitted.
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even then ethnographers often & il apprehend the relevant contextual fiactors because of 
the difGculty of their work. Mathematical modeling of behavior, as an alternative 
approach, reduces contextual factors to attribute variables; the development of 
interactionist sociology was, in many respects, a response to the inability for statistical 
analysis or mathematical modeling to capture important characteristics o f context. It 
would be unwise if  our attempt to forge a better way of understanding our behavior 
required us to take two steps back. Another approach is to use experimental control on 
contextual factors. While this may yield information about evolved responses to factors in 
a controlled context, we must then rely on comparative methods to attempt to determine 
if  these responses actually occur during interactions in the day-to-day lived world.
What we need is a way of integrating approaches so that explanations take into 
account the contextual factors of behavior in sifw. Such a limitation of contemporary 
sociobiological approaches is recognized by many researchers, who, for example, hold 
out that future studies w ill show "that we have evolved psychological mechanisms 
sensitive to contexts as yet not envisioned" (Buss 1997:193). This context may be out of 
the methodological grasp of sociobiological researchers, but the tool of interactionist 
sociology can open sociobiology up to a world not yet envisioned.
The Sociological Connection 
The logic of incorporating biology to the study of human social organization is clear. 
Rather than relying solely on social science explanations, a biosocial approach can 
"account k r  many of the known facts in a more convincing manner than do previous 
attempts but should also identify the need for new kinds of information not 
conceptualized by the unaided social sciences" (Wilson 1978:4) This also holds true in
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the reverse direction; incoporating social sciences to the study of biology has its 
advantages as well. Interactionist sociology can provide a new kind of information about 
context, motivation, and meaning that is not conceptualized by the unaided biological 
sciences. Indeed, the benefits of a biosocial approach have long been recognized by some 
in sociology:
What is needed is not a life-death struggle between sociology and sociobiology, but two 
disciplines that can begin to communicate and cooperate with one another and develop 
more sophisticated models of human societies and individual behavior than either alone 
could create. (Lenski 1977:75)
Sociologists have more recently begun to promote the advantages to sociology of such 
a synthesis (Freese, AUen Li, and Wade 2003; Udry 1995). I  wish to reiterate some of 
these advantages and suggest a few additional ways that a biosocial approach can be 
benehcial. The first, and most obvious, is that biosocial models can be more successfiil 
than models that rely on only biological or social factors. Evidence of this can be fbimd in 
Udry (1988), who predicts adolescent sexuality using a biosocial model that turns out to 
be a significant improvement on its component biological and sociological models.
A second use of a biosocial ^proach is to revitalize rational-choice theories 
(Kanazawa 2001 ; Nesse 2001). By providing a definition of rationality that is satisfactory 
to the findings h"om biological research, rational-choice theories can escape the problem 
of stretching the notion of rationahty too far and begin to provide a useful method for 
explaining social behavior. Especially relevant to this project are evolutionary psychology 
and memetics; the more we understand about how individuals make choices, assess 
contextual factors, and assign value to actions, the better a rational-choice theory w ill be 
able to explain and predict behavior.
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An evolütionarily-informed rational-choice theory would present a novel approach to 
studying institutions and affecting their organization through policy recommendations. 
This is a way for rational-choice theory to applies to the real world (Gigerenzer 2000). 
MindAd use of game theory in our policies can be a way to effect institutional change by 
creating institutional rules where it is more beneAcial to play by the rules than to violate 
them. The Superfund can be thought of as an example of this; it is an attempt to inflict 
greater costs to those responsible for contamination and pollution than the beneAts (in 
terms of cost-cutting) that polluAng would normally have. The U.S. ConsAtuAon is 
another example; the separation of powers provides each branch of the government with 
ways to Aght off encroachment by the other two branches to prevent concentraAon of 
power. SeparaAon of powers, by its design, protects Aeedom and poliAcal process at the 
cost of eAiciency.
InsAtuAons operate on both micro and macro levels of analyses, internally and 
externally, in terms of the funcAoning of an insAtuAon vis-a-vis its consAtuent members, 
individuals it serves, its overall internal structure, and its relaAonship and interacAon with 
other insAtuAons. In any of these four areas, the way the insAtuAon funcAons can be 
modiAed by an applicaAon of the insights of raAonal-choice theory and game theory. On 
the micro-level of analysis— the relaAonship between insAtuAons and individuals—  
raAonal-choice theory can be thought of as an analysis of insAtuAons and bureaucracy, in 
the tradiAon of Weber and Blau. On the macro-level of analysis— an insAtuAon's 
structure and relaAonship to other insAtuAons within society— game theory can offer 
unexpected insights into how insAtuAons funcAon and interrelate.
Perhaps the most signiAcant avenue for a biosocial approach is its potenAal 
contribuAons to the interacAonist school of sociology. InteracAonist sociology is a tool
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par exceZZence for studying particular types of social phenomena: the meaning that 
individuals attribute to interacAons and social behavior; the way in which individuals 
learn and use symbolic media; the moAvaAons and intenAons of individuals; the ways in 
which individuals provide interpretations of social interacAons; and the ways in which the 
interpreAve process is culture-bound, or more speciAcally, context-bound. By drawing 
hom biology— including sources like evoluAonary psychology, behavioral ecology, and 
neurophysiology— interacAonist theory can improve by acquiring a crucial component 
that had been missing. That component is the scienAGc knowledge of human nature. With 
this knowledge, it can begin to advance explanaAons tor why behavior varies by context, 
for why individuals assign parAcular meanings to behaviors, for why individuals have the 
moAvaAons and intenAons that they do. By accepting that biology plays a part in shaping 
social interacAon and in how individuals assign meaning to those interacAons, we can 
begin to suggest the contextual features that are important to look for and the reasons why 
contextual variaAon maAers so greatly. EvoluAonary psychology suggests the critena for 
determining what contextual factors are important to human behavior. We can reposiAon 
interacAonist sociology to explain interpretaAon and meaning by understanding the 
underlying &ctors that humans have evolved to be sensiAve to. This is not to say 
interacAonist sociology should abandon its research programme; no, it should expand by 
incorporating the relevant insights Aom biology, and coimect with the attempts by 
biology to understand context and meaning.
Furthermore, a biologically-informed interacAonist sociology would be a usefiil 
starting point for theones of the middle ground, or connecting together the various 
sociological levels of analysis. Just as interacAonism can bring the insights of biology to 
aid its inquiry, sociological analysis that focuses on higher-level organizaAon and the
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
structure o f society can incorporate the insights of interacAonist sociology. Because a 
biosocial interacAonist approach can propose and test hypotheses about how context 
affects subjecAve interpretaAons, it would Aee interacAonist sociology Aom offering 
descripAve analysis that is necessarily context-bound.
There is one more advantage of a biosocial approach to studying human behavior. It 
would provide the most empincally adequate exqxlanaAon &*r social phenomena. I f  we 
desAe to not only know the world, but to change it, then being aware of its true and 
mulAple causes is the Arst step toward implementing policies meant to implement change 
to existing social relaAons. Research in the area of biosocial theones has only recenAy 
begun, and down that path lies the promise of a new way to better understanding human 
behavior.
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